The auth proxy was only given the user and their password or public
key, so a proxy program had no way to restrict logins to particular
networks, or to record where an authentication attempt came from.
The JSON sent to the program now has a client_ip key holding the bare
IP the client connected from, with the port stripped so IPv6 arrives
as 2001:db8::1 rather than [2001:db8::1]:52344. An IPv4-mapped IPv6
address is reported as plain IPv4 so that a client arriving over a
dual-stack listener still matches IPv4 networks. The key is omitted
when the client has no IP address.
The IP is also mixed into the backend cache key. That is needed as the
program is only run on a cache miss, so a client from a
non-allowlisted address presenting valid credentials within the 5
minute cache lifetime would get a cache hit and be let in without the
program being consulted at all.
Before this change, if the user changed their password or public-key
and the auth proxy script returned updated config parameters for the
backend (eg a rotated api_key) rclone would continue to re-use the old
backend with the old config parameters out of the fscache.
This was because both the VFS cache and the fs/cache key were derived
from the user name only, so a change in the user's password or
public-key did not invalidate the cached backend.
Fix this by deriving the cache key from the user plus a hash of the
password/public-key, so a credential change forces a fresh backend.
The hash uses a per-process random HMAC key so the fragment that
appears in logs cannot be brute-forced offline.
This changes log statements from log to fs package, which is required for --use-json-log
to properly make log output in JSON format. The recently added custom linting rule,
handled by ruleguard via gocritic via golangci-lint, warns about these and suggests
the alternative. Fixing was therefore basically running "golangci-lint run --fix",
although some manual fixup of mainly imports are necessary following that.
This adds a context.Context parameter to NewFs and related calls.
This is necessary as part of reading config from the context -
backends need to be able to read the global config.
Unfortunately bcrypt only hashes the first 72 bytes of a given input
which meant that using it on ssh keys which are longer than 72 bytes
was incorrect.
This swaps over to using sha256 which should be adequate for the
purpose of protecting in memory passwords where the unencrypted
password is likely in memory too.
am-at-enrollvbandGitHub
Nick Craig-Wood
albertonyandNick Craig-Wood
Paul TinsleyandNick Craig-Wood