A successful UploadPart whose response carries no ETag header made
WriteChunk panic dereferencing uout.ETag in a debug log line. The part
ETag is required by CompleteMultipartUpload, so an ETag-less 200 is
unusable: return a retryable error from inside the pacer callback so
the chunk is retried instead of crashing the transfer or completing
the upload with a broken part list.
Fixes#9822
Co-authored-by: Shurong Cao <170531907+CAOShurong@users.noreply.github.com>
Nextcloud only stores a checksum which is supplied in the OC-Checksum
header of an upload, and discards it again when the modification time
is set with PROPPATCH. Re-sending the checksum in the PROPPATCH (as is
done for ownCloud) is rejected by Nextcloud with 403 Forbidden which
made the whole PROPPATCH fail, so SetModTime returned an error on any
object which had a hash. Uploads from sources without hashes, eg
streamed uploads with `rclone rcat`, were stored with no hash at all.
Use the Nextcloud PATCH extension with the X-Recalculate-Hash header
to have the server calculate and store the SHA1 of an object after a
streamed upload and after setting the modification time. This gives
a server side hash of the stored data which also lets rclone verify
streamed uploads.
If the source supplied fewer bytes than its declared size, the single
part upload path accepted the short body and stored a truncated file
recorded with the declared size, reporting a successful upload. The
multipart path already checks for this.
Count the bytes actually read and fail the upload if they do not match
the declared size, which cancels the partially created file.
This was found by the FsPutShortEOF integration test.
listSharedFolders already decoded shared-folder names with
f.opt.Enc.ToStandardName, but listReceivedFiles stored the raw name
returned by the Dropbox API unchanged. Names that require encoding
(e.g. a trailing space, which Dropbox itself rejects, so rclone
stores it as "name␠" via EncodeRightSpace) were therefore shown under
their raw, encoded form for received files instead of being decoded
back to the standard name, and findSharedFile could not resolve such
a file by its standard name.
Apply the same ToStandardName conversion listSharedFolders uses.
On a ranged download the metadata decoder stored the response's
Content-Length (the length of the range, not the blob) in the object's
size and only corrected it from the Content-Range total afterwards.
Object.Size() is read concurrently by the VFS cache and chunked reader
while a download is in progress, so with --vfs-read-chunk-size a reader
could observe the chunk length (e.g. 67108864 for 64M chunks) as the
object size. The VFS cache then logged
vfs cache: cached file (N) is unexpectedly larger than the remote
object (67108864). The cached file is likely corrupted after an
unclean shutdown; recovering ...
and truncated the read request against the bogus size, breaking
sequential reads of large blobs with --vfs-cache-mode full.
This applies the Content-Range correction before the size is stored so
the range length is never published as the object size.
The multipart upload copied the source into the request buffer without
checking how many bytes it had read, so a source that supplied fewer
bytes than its declared size was accepted by the server and reported as
a success with a truncated file stored.
Count the bytes actually read and fail the upload if they do not match
the declared size.
Signed-off-by: Rohit Behera <126186063+r0h1tb@users.noreply.github.com>
The single-shot upload path sent the source straight to Box as a multipart
body with no Content-Length, so a source that supplied fewer bytes than its
declared size produced a short request that Box accepted and stored, and the
upload was reported as a success.
Count the bytes actually read and fail the upload if they do not match the
declared size. The multipart path already reads each chunk with io.ReadFull
and so already fails in this case.
The concurrent walker created by walk() only stopped when the callback
returned an error or the whole tree had been listed. Cancelling the
context (for example via the rc job/stop endpoint for an async
operations/size or recursive operations/list call) was therefore
ignored: the checkers kept pulling list jobs from the channel and kept
listing the entire tree, burning CPU and making job cancellation
useless for every backend without a native ListR implementation.
Make every checker select on ctx.Done() so a cancelled walk shuts down
promptly through the existing quit/drain path and reports the context
error. Also check the context between directory read chunks in the
local backend so a single huge directory does not block cancellation.
Update already wrapped the source in a counting reader but never looked at the
count, so a source that supplied fewer bytes than its declared size was
uploaded as a chunked request, accepted by the server and reported as a
success with a truncated file stored.
Compare the bytes actually read against the declared size.
When copying to the local backend with checksums enabled (the default),
rclone hashed the incoming data by wrapping the source reader in an
io.TeeReader. TeeReader has no WriteTo method, so io.Copy could not use
the source's fast path and fell back to its generic 32 KiB buffer loop.
The same wrapping also stopped the destination *os.File using
copy_file_range, since the source was no longer a raw fd.
This meant checksummed copies were written in 32 KiB chunks whereas
--ignore-checksum copies were written in much larger blocks (typically
1 MiB). On filesystems where small writes are expensive, such as FUSE
mounts like LucidLink, this made a big difference: copying a 100 MiB
file took 3203 x 32 KiB writes in 3.6s, and now takes 108 x ~1 MiB
writes in 0.47s.
When a multi-thread source ignores ranged reads, abort the partial
destination and retry the copy as a single stream. Reset accounting
before the fallback so transfer progress remains accurate.
Validate ranged GET responses before returning their bodies. Close invalid
responses, retry malformed partial responses through the pacer, and return
without retrying when a server deterministically ignores Range.
Fixes#6980
Before this change, when no_data_encryption was set, uploads from
local disk advertised the hash of the encrypted data even though the
data was uploaded unencrypted.
On backends which check upload hashes (eg b2) this made uploads of
small files fail with errors like "Checksum did not match data
received", and made chunked uploads store an incorrect hash so the
files failed their checksum on download with "corrupted on transfer:
SHA1 hashes differ".
See: https://forum.rclone.org/t/sha1-mismatches-on-b2-with-no-data-encryption-true/54121
Writing any file into a third-party app container - the Obsidian, Pages or
Shortcuts folders that iCloud Drive shows alongside your own - failed with
HTTP error 412 (412 Precondition Failed) returned body:
"{ ... \"error_code\" : \"VALIDATING_REFERENCE_ERROR\", \"reason\" :
\"Request has out of order children to be chained but the parents were
missing\" }"
Reading from those paths worked, and so did creating directories in them, so
the failure looked like a missing parent when the parent was plainly there.
Items in an app container live in a different zone from ordinary iCloud Drive
folders: a folder under Documents has a drive ID like
FOLDER::com.apple.CloudDocs::<uuid>, while the Obsidian container has
FOLDER::iCloud.md.obsidian::documents#o2v. DownloadFile already accounts for
this - it deconstructs the item's own ID and addresses the zone it finds - but
CreateUpload and UpdateFile hardcoded defaultZone, and UpdateFile built the
resulting Drivewsid with a hardcoded com.apple.CloudDocs as well.
So rclone asked Apple to chain the new document to a parent in
com.apple.CloudDocs while the parent lived in iCloud.md.obsidian. The parent
really was missing from the zone being addressed, which is what the error said.
Take the zone from the parent's drive ID instead, the same way the download
path does, and build the new item's ID with ConstructDriveID. Uploads outside
an app container are unaffected: their parents are in com.apple.CloudDocs, so
the derived zone is the value that was previously hardcoded.
Verified against a real remote: files now upload into an Obsidian vault inside
the container and read back correctly with an unpatched binary afterwards.
If the source supplied fewer bytes than its declared size, the upload
request failed but a retry could report success even though the stored
file was truncated, because the retry re-sent an already exhausted
reader.
Count the bytes actually read from the source and if they do not match
the declared size return an error.
This was found by the new FsPutShortEOF integration test.
If the source supplied fewer bytes than its declared size, the upload
request failed but a retry could report success even though the stored
file was truncated, because the retry re-sent an already exhausted
reader.
Count the bytes actually read from the source and if they do not match
the declared size, remove the partially uploaded file and return an
error.
This was found by the new FsPutShortEOF integration test.
If the source supplied fewer bytes than its declared size, the
multipart upload was completed anyway, storing a truncated file and
reporting a successful upload.
Check the number of bytes read from the source against the declared
size before finalising and abort the upload with an error if they do
not match.
This was found by the new FsPutShortEOF integration test.
If the source supplied fewer bytes than its declared size, the
truncated file was stored and the upload reported success with the
object claiming the declared size.
Count the bytes actually read from the source and if they do not match
the declared size, remove the truncated file and return an error.
This was found by the new TestRcatSizeShortEOF integration test.
The file is created at the declared size and the data then written
with ranged writes, so if the source supplied fewer bytes than
declared, the remainder of the file was left as zeroes and the upload
reported success.
Count the bytes actually read from the source and if they do not match
the declared size, delete the partially uploaded file (if newly
created) and return an error.
This was found by the new FsPutShortEOF and TestRcatSizeShortEOF
integration tests.
When using Microsoft Entra ID credentials, Azure Blob server-side copy
uses a user delegation SAS URL for the private copy source.
The SAS start time was set to the current local time. Azure Storage
validates the copy source from the service side, and small clock
differences can make that SAS appear not yet valid. The service then
returns 403 CannotVerifyCopySource with AuthenticationFailed.
Start the copy-source SAS 15 minutes in the past, matching Microsoft SAS
guidance for clock skew.
The precision field in the backend overview YAML files can hold
fs.ModTimeNotSupported (100 years in nanoseconds) which overflows int
on 32 bit platforms, making the YAML for those backends fail to parse
and causing rclone to log 18 internal errors on every invocation.
Use int64 for the precision field and add a test that parses every
embedded backend YAML file so this is caught on 32 bit test runs.
When an upload failed part way through with a retryable error (eg a
502 from the block storage servers) the pacer retried the whole upload
call with the same input stream. The stream had already been partially
consumed, so the retry re-created the upload draft and committed just
the remainder of the stream as a complete file, silently truncating
it. With restic over serve restic this corrupted the repository as the
truncated pack was reported as successfully uploaded.
This fixes it by using CallNoRetry for the upload, as the other
backends do, so retryable errors are returned wrapped in a RetryError
for the caller to retry the upload with a fresh stream.
When the source supplied fewer bytes than its declared size, the
compressed data file was stored under a name containing the declared
size while the metadata recorded the actual number of bytes read.
NewObject looks the data file up by the size in the metadata, so the
resulting object could never be read again, and the upload reported
success.
Check that the number of bytes read matches the declared size after
uploading the data and before writing the metadata, and remove the
data file and return an error if it does not.
This was found by the new FsPutShortEOF integration test.
The append loop retries everything once the upload session has
started, so a cancelled context error was retried through all the low
level retries with exponential backoff before the upload gave up.
A source which returned EOF before supplying as many bytes as it
declared would either commit a truncated file (if the shortfall was
within the final chunk) or loop forever appending empty chunks to the
upload session. Return an error wrapping io.ErrUnexpectedEOF instead.
Note that all dropbox uploads use the chunked upload path with the
default batch_mode of sync, so this affected uploads of every size.
Object.Update held its connection until the deferred putConnection ran at
function exit, so the SetModTime it does at the end of every upload had to take
a second connection from the pool, dialling a whole new SMB session when the
pool was empty. With N transfers in flight the pool grew to roughly 2N sessions
for no reason.
Return the connection as soon as the file is closed. At that point the upload
has succeeded and remove() can no longer be reached, so nothing else needs it,
and SetModTime picks the same connection straight back out of the pool.
putConnection nils the pointer, so the deferred putConnection becomes a no-op
and the connection is not returned twice.
purgeCheck listed a directory's children with includeAll set, so the Drive API
returned trashed children as well as live ones. The only thing that came of
that was the trashedFiles flag, which is used solely to decide whether to trash
the directory or delete it permanently, and when use_trash is on the directory
gets trashed either way.
That made the common case pay for nothing: after trashing N files in a
directory, removing the now empty directory paged through all N trashed entries,
about one API call and pacer delay per 1000, instead of running a single query
that returns nothing.
Ask the server to filter out trashed children when the directory is going to be
trashed anyway. Hard deletes still enumerate them, since there the distinction
decides whether the directory can be removed permanently (#1040), and
--drive-trashed-only is left alone because it deliberately lists trashed items.
Direct lookups of exported Dropbox Paper files retained the
caller-visible extension before export metadata processing appended it
again. Track when metadata was resolved through an export path so the
object keeps the requested remote name while listing behavior remains
unchanged.
The local backend built every OS path by joining the root with the source
name converted through the configured encoding, so the encoding was the only
thing keeping a name from turning into path syntax.
With an encoding which omits Dot (Slash, None, Raw) rclone's standard ".."
decodes back to a real "..", and with an encoding which omits BackSlash a name
like "..\file" becomes a native path on Windows. filepath.Join then resolved
those out of the destination the user chose, so a source object called
"../marker.txt" - an s3 key of "tenant/../marker.txt" listed with the remote
rooted at "tenant", say - created or overwrote a file outside it.
localPath now joins the name to the root and checks with filepath.Rel that the
result is still inside it. localPath is the only place the root is joined to a
name, so threading the error through newObject and newDirectory covers every
operation.
Default configurations were not affected, as encoder.OS includes Dot on all
platforms and BackSlash on Windows.
Fixes GHSA-7p4m-qxvv-g567