vendor: update github.com/t3rm1n4l/go-mega to fix mega "illegal base64 data at input byte 22"

Thanks to Ajaja for figuring this out.

See: https://forum.rclone.org/t/problem-to-login-with-mega/12276
This commit is contained in:
Nick Craig-Wood
2020-01-11 16:47:06 +00:00
parent 87c844bce1
commit 92662baceb
41 changed files with 643 additions and 5107 deletions
-308
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@@ -1,308 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.11
// +build !gccgo,!appengine
#include "textflag.h"
#define NUM_ROUNDS 10
// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32)
TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
MOVD dst+0(FP), R1
MOVD src+24(FP), R2
MOVD src_len+32(FP), R3
MOVD key+48(FP), R4
MOVD nonce+56(FP), R6
MOVD counter+64(FP), R7
MOVD $·constants(SB), R10
MOVD $·incRotMatrix(SB), R11
MOVW (R7), R20
AND $~255, R3, R13
ADD R2, R13, R12 // R12 for block end
AND $255, R3, R13
loop:
MOVD $NUM_ROUNDS, R21
VLD1 (R11), [V30.S4, V31.S4]
// load contants
// VLD4R (R10), [V0.S4, V1.S4, V2.S4, V3.S4]
WORD $0x4D60E940
// load keys
// VLD4R 16(R4), [V4.S4, V5.S4, V6.S4, V7.S4]
WORD $0x4DFFE884
// VLD4R 16(R4), [V8.S4, V9.S4, V10.S4, V11.S4]
WORD $0x4DFFE888
SUB $32, R4
// load counter + nonce
// VLD1R (R7), [V12.S4]
WORD $0x4D40C8EC
// VLD3R (R6), [V13.S4, V14.S4, V15.S4]
WORD $0x4D40E8CD
// update counter
VADD V30.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4
chacha:
// V0..V3 += V4..V7
// V12..V15 <<<= ((V12..V15 XOR V0..V3), 16)
VADD V0.S4, V4.S4, V0.S4
VADD V1.S4, V5.S4, V1.S4
VADD V2.S4, V6.S4, V2.S4
VADD V3.S4, V7.S4, V3.S4
VEOR V12.B16, V0.B16, V12.B16
VEOR V13.B16, V1.B16, V13.B16
VEOR V14.B16, V2.B16, V14.B16
VEOR V15.B16, V3.B16, V15.B16
VREV32 V12.H8, V12.H8
VREV32 V13.H8, V13.H8
VREV32 V14.H8, V14.H8
VREV32 V15.H8, V15.H8
// V8..V11 += V12..V15
// V4..V7 <<<= ((V4..V7 XOR V8..V11), 12)
VADD V8.S4, V12.S4, V8.S4
VADD V9.S4, V13.S4, V9.S4
VADD V10.S4, V14.S4, V10.S4
VADD V11.S4, V15.S4, V11.S4
VEOR V8.B16, V4.B16, V16.B16
VEOR V9.B16, V5.B16, V17.B16
VEOR V10.B16, V6.B16, V18.B16
VEOR V11.B16, V7.B16, V19.B16
VSHL $12, V16.S4, V4.S4
VSHL $12, V17.S4, V5.S4
VSHL $12, V18.S4, V6.S4
VSHL $12, V19.S4, V7.S4
VSRI $20, V16.S4, V4.S4
VSRI $20, V17.S4, V5.S4
VSRI $20, V18.S4, V6.S4
VSRI $20, V19.S4, V7.S4
// V0..V3 += V4..V7
// V12..V15 <<<= ((V12..V15 XOR V0..V3), 8)
VADD V0.S4, V4.S4, V0.S4
VADD V1.S4, V5.S4, V1.S4
VADD V2.S4, V6.S4, V2.S4
VADD V3.S4, V7.S4, V3.S4
VEOR V12.B16, V0.B16, V12.B16
VEOR V13.B16, V1.B16, V13.B16
VEOR V14.B16, V2.B16, V14.B16
VEOR V15.B16, V3.B16, V15.B16
VTBL V31.B16, [V12.B16], V12.B16
VTBL V31.B16, [V13.B16], V13.B16
VTBL V31.B16, [V14.B16], V14.B16
VTBL V31.B16, [V15.B16], V15.B16
// V8..V11 += V12..V15
// V4..V7 <<<= ((V4..V7 XOR V8..V11), 7)
VADD V12.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4
VADD V13.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4
VADD V14.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4
VADD V15.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4
VEOR V8.B16, V4.B16, V16.B16
VEOR V9.B16, V5.B16, V17.B16
VEOR V10.B16, V6.B16, V18.B16
VEOR V11.B16, V7.B16, V19.B16
VSHL $7, V16.S4, V4.S4
VSHL $7, V17.S4, V5.S4
VSHL $7, V18.S4, V6.S4
VSHL $7, V19.S4, V7.S4
VSRI $25, V16.S4, V4.S4
VSRI $25, V17.S4, V5.S4
VSRI $25, V18.S4, V6.S4
VSRI $25, V19.S4, V7.S4
// V0..V3 += V5..V7, V4
// V15,V12-V14 <<<= ((V15,V12-V14 XOR V0..V3), 16)
VADD V0.S4, V5.S4, V0.S4
VADD V1.S4, V6.S4, V1.S4
VADD V2.S4, V7.S4, V2.S4
VADD V3.S4, V4.S4, V3.S4
VEOR V15.B16, V0.B16, V15.B16
VEOR V12.B16, V1.B16, V12.B16
VEOR V13.B16, V2.B16, V13.B16
VEOR V14.B16, V3.B16, V14.B16
VREV32 V12.H8, V12.H8
VREV32 V13.H8, V13.H8
VREV32 V14.H8, V14.H8
VREV32 V15.H8, V15.H8
// V10 += V15; V5 <<<= ((V10 XOR V5), 12)
// ...
VADD V15.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4
VADD V12.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4
VADD V13.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4
VADD V14.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4
VEOR V10.B16, V5.B16, V16.B16
VEOR V11.B16, V6.B16, V17.B16
VEOR V8.B16, V7.B16, V18.B16
VEOR V9.B16, V4.B16, V19.B16
VSHL $12, V16.S4, V5.S4
VSHL $12, V17.S4, V6.S4
VSHL $12, V18.S4, V7.S4
VSHL $12, V19.S4, V4.S4
VSRI $20, V16.S4, V5.S4
VSRI $20, V17.S4, V6.S4
VSRI $20, V18.S4, V7.S4
VSRI $20, V19.S4, V4.S4
// V0 += V5; V15 <<<= ((V0 XOR V15), 8)
// ...
VADD V5.S4, V0.S4, V0.S4
VADD V6.S4, V1.S4, V1.S4
VADD V7.S4, V2.S4, V2.S4
VADD V4.S4, V3.S4, V3.S4
VEOR V0.B16, V15.B16, V15.B16
VEOR V1.B16, V12.B16, V12.B16
VEOR V2.B16, V13.B16, V13.B16
VEOR V3.B16, V14.B16, V14.B16
VTBL V31.B16, [V12.B16], V12.B16
VTBL V31.B16, [V13.B16], V13.B16
VTBL V31.B16, [V14.B16], V14.B16
VTBL V31.B16, [V15.B16], V15.B16
// V10 += V15; V5 <<<= ((V10 XOR V5), 7)
// ...
VADD V15.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4
VADD V12.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4
VADD V13.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4
VADD V14.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4
VEOR V10.B16, V5.B16, V16.B16
VEOR V11.B16, V6.B16, V17.B16
VEOR V8.B16, V7.B16, V18.B16
VEOR V9.B16, V4.B16, V19.B16
VSHL $7, V16.S4, V5.S4
VSHL $7, V17.S4, V6.S4
VSHL $7, V18.S4, V7.S4
VSHL $7, V19.S4, V4.S4
VSRI $25, V16.S4, V5.S4
VSRI $25, V17.S4, V6.S4
VSRI $25, V18.S4, V7.S4
VSRI $25, V19.S4, V4.S4
SUB $1, R21
CBNZ R21, chacha
// VLD4R (R10), [V16.S4, V17.S4, V18.S4, V19.S4]
WORD $0x4D60E950
// VLD4R 16(R4), [V20.S4, V21.S4, V22.S4, V23.S4]
WORD $0x4DFFE894
VADD V30.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4
VADD V16.S4, V0.S4, V0.S4
VADD V17.S4, V1.S4, V1.S4
VADD V18.S4, V2.S4, V2.S4
VADD V19.S4, V3.S4, V3.S4
// VLD4R 16(R4), [V24.S4, V25.S4, V26.S4, V27.S4]
WORD $0x4DFFE898
// restore R4
SUB $32, R4
// load counter + nonce
// VLD1R (R7), [V28.S4]
WORD $0x4D40C8FC
// VLD3R (R6), [V29.S4, V30.S4, V31.S4]
WORD $0x4D40E8DD
VADD V20.S4, V4.S4, V4.S4
VADD V21.S4, V5.S4, V5.S4
VADD V22.S4, V6.S4, V6.S4
VADD V23.S4, V7.S4, V7.S4
VADD V24.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4
VADD V25.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4
VADD V26.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4
VADD V27.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4
VADD V28.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4
VADD V29.S4, V13.S4, V13.S4
VADD V30.S4, V14.S4, V14.S4
VADD V31.S4, V15.S4, V15.S4
VZIP1 V1.S4, V0.S4, V16.S4
VZIP2 V1.S4, V0.S4, V17.S4
VZIP1 V3.S4, V2.S4, V18.S4
VZIP2 V3.S4, V2.S4, V19.S4
VZIP1 V5.S4, V4.S4, V20.S4
VZIP2 V5.S4, V4.S4, V21.S4
VZIP1 V7.S4, V6.S4, V22.S4
VZIP2 V7.S4, V6.S4, V23.S4
VZIP1 V9.S4, V8.S4, V24.S4
VZIP2 V9.S4, V8.S4, V25.S4
VZIP1 V11.S4, V10.S4, V26.S4
VZIP2 V11.S4, V10.S4, V27.S4
VZIP1 V13.S4, V12.S4, V28.S4
VZIP2 V13.S4, V12.S4, V29.S4
VZIP1 V15.S4, V14.S4, V30.S4
VZIP2 V15.S4, V14.S4, V31.S4
VZIP1 V18.D2, V16.D2, V0.D2
VZIP2 V18.D2, V16.D2, V4.D2
VZIP1 V19.D2, V17.D2, V8.D2
VZIP2 V19.D2, V17.D2, V12.D2
VLD1.P 64(R2), [V16.B16, V17.B16, V18.B16, V19.B16]
VZIP1 V22.D2, V20.D2, V1.D2
VZIP2 V22.D2, V20.D2, V5.D2
VZIP1 V23.D2, V21.D2, V9.D2
VZIP2 V23.D2, V21.D2, V13.D2
VLD1.P 64(R2), [V20.B16, V21.B16, V22.B16, V23.B16]
VZIP1 V26.D2, V24.D2, V2.D2
VZIP2 V26.D2, V24.D2, V6.D2
VZIP1 V27.D2, V25.D2, V10.D2
VZIP2 V27.D2, V25.D2, V14.D2
VLD1.P 64(R2), [V24.B16, V25.B16, V26.B16, V27.B16]
VZIP1 V30.D2, V28.D2, V3.D2
VZIP2 V30.D2, V28.D2, V7.D2
VZIP1 V31.D2, V29.D2, V11.D2
VZIP2 V31.D2, V29.D2, V15.D2
VLD1.P 64(R2), [V28.B16, V29.B16, V30.B16, V31.B16]
VEOR V0.B16, V16.B16, V16.B16
VEOR V1.B16, V17.B16, V17.B16
VEOR V2.B16, V18.B16, V18.B16
VEOR V3.B16, V19.B16, V19.B16
VST1.P [V16.B16, V17.B16, V18.B16, V19.B16], 64(R1)
VEOR V4.B16, V20.B16, V20.B16
VEOR V5.B16, V21.B16, V21.B16
VEOR V6.B16, V22.B16, V22.B16
VEOR V7.B16, V23.B16, V23.B16
VST1.P [V20.B16, V21.B16, V22.B16, V23.B16], 64(R1)
VEOR V8.B16, V24.B16, V24.B16
VEOR V9.B16, V25.B16, V25.B16
VEOR V10.B16, V26.B16, V26.B16
VEOR V11.B16, V27.B16, V27.B16
VST1.P [V24.B16, V25.B16, V26.B16, V27.B16], 64(R1)
VEOR V12.B16, V28.B16, V28.B16
VEOR V13.B16, V29.B16, V29.B16
VEOR V14.B16, V30.B16, V30.B16
VEOR V15.B16, V31.B16, V31.B16
VST1.P [V28.B16, V29.B16, V30.B16, V31.B16], 64(R1)
ADD $4, R20
MOVW R20, (R7) // update counter
CMP R2, R12
BGT loop
RET
DATA ·constants+0x00(SB)/4, $0x61707865
DATA ·constants+0x04(SB)/4, $0x3320646e
DATA ·constants+0x08(SB)/4, $0x79622d32
DATA ·constants+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574
GLOBL ·constants(SB), NOPTR|RODATA, $32
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x00(SB)/4, $0x00000000
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x04(SB)/4, $0x00000001
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x08(SB)/4, $0x00000002
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x00000003
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x10(SB)/4, $0x02010003
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x14(SB)/4, $0x06050407
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x18(SB)/4, $0x0A09080B
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x0E0D0C0F
GLOBL ·incRotMatrix(SB), NOPTR|RODATA, $32
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// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Based on CRYPTOGAMS code with the following comment:
// # ====================================================================
// # Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
// # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
// # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
// # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
// # ====================================================================
// Code for the perl script that generates the ppc64 assembler
// can be found in the cryptogams repository at the link below. It is based on
// the original from openssl.
// https://github.com/dot-asm/cryptogams/commit/a60f5b50ed908e91
// The differences in this and the original implementation are
// due to the calling conventions and initialization of constants.
// +build ppc64le,!gccgo,!appengine
#include "textflag.h"
#define OUT R3
#define INP R4
#define LEN R5
#define KEY R6
#define CNT R7
#define TMP R15
#define CONSTBASE R16
#define X0 R11
#define X1 R12
#define X2 R14
#define X3 R15
#define X4 R16
#define X5 R17
#define X6 R18
#define X7 R19
#define X8 R20
#define X9 R21
#define X10 R22
#define X11 R23
#define X12 R24
#define X13 R25
#define X14 R26
#define X15 R27
DATA consts<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x3320646e61707865
DATA consts<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x6b20657479622d32
DATA consts<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000001
DATA consts<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
DATA consts<>+0x20(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000004
DATA consts<>+0x28(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
DATA consts<>+0x30(SB)/8, $0x0a0b08090e0f0c0d
DATA consts<>+0x38(SB)/8, $0x0203000106070405
DATA consts<>+0x40(SB)/8, $0x090a0b080d0e0f0c
DATA consts<>+0x48(SB)/8, $0x0102030005060704
DATA consts<>+0x50(SB)/8, $0x6170786561707865
DATA consts<>+0x58(SB)/8, $0x6170786561707865
DATA consts<>+0x60(SB)/8, $0x3320646e3320646e
DATA consts<>+0x68(SB)/8, $0x3320646e3320646e
DATA consts<>+0x70(SB)/8, $0x79622d3279622d32
DATA consts<>+0x78(SB)/8, $0x79622d3279622d32
DATA consts<>+0x80(SB)/8, $0x6b2065746b206574
DATA consts<>+0x88(SB)/8, $0x6b2065746b206574
DATA consts<>+0x90(SB)/8, $0x0000000100000000
DATA consts<>+0x98(SB)/8, $0x0000000300000002
GLOBL consts<>(SB), RODATA, $0xa0
//func chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32)
TEXT ·chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(SB),NOSPLIT,$64-40
MOVD out+0(FP), OUT
MOVD inp+8(FP), INP
MOVD len+16(FP), LEN
MOVD key+24(FP), KEY
MOVD counter+32(FP), CNT
// Addressing for constants
MOVD $consts<>+0x00(SB), CONSTBASE
MOVD $16, R8
MOVD $32, R9
MOVD $48, R10
MOVD $64, R11
// V16
LXVW4X (CONSTBASE)(R0), VS48
ADD $80,CONSTBASE
// Load key into V17,V18
LXVW4X (KEY)(R0), VS49
LXVW4X (KEY)(R8), VS50
// Load CNT, NONCE into V19
LXVW4X (CNT)(R0), VS51
// Clear V27
VXOR V27, V27, V27
// V28
LXVW4X (CONSTBASE)(R11), VS60
// splat slot from V19 -> V26
VSPLTW $0, V19, V26
VSLDOI $4, V19, V27, V19
VSLDOI $12, V27, V19, V19
VADDUWM V26, V28, V26
MOVD $10, R14
MOVD R14, CTR
loop_outer_vsx:
// V0, V1, V2, V3
LXVW4X (R0)(CONSTBASE), VS32
LXVW4X (R8)(CONSTBASE), VS33
LXVW4X (R9)(CONSTBASE), VS34
LXVW4X (R10)(CONSTBASE), VS35
// splat values from V17, V18 into V4-V11
VSPLTW $0, V17, V4
VSPLTW $1, V17, V5
VSPLTW $2, V17, V6
VSPLTW $3, V17, V7
VSPLTW $0, V18, V8
VSPLTW $1, V18, V9
VSPLTW $2, V18, V10
VSPLTW $3, V18, V11
// VOR
VOR V26, V26, V12
// splat values from V19 -> V13, V14, V15
VSPLTW $1, V19, V13
VSPLTW $2, V19, V14
VSPLTW $3, V19, V15
// splat const values
VSPLTISW $-16, V27
VSPLTISW $12, V28
VSPLTISW $8, V29
VSPLTISW $7, V30
loop_vsx:
VADDUWM V0, V4, V0
VADDUWM V1, V5, V1
VADDUWM V2, V6, V2
VADDUWM V3, V7, V3
VXOR V12, V0, V12
VXOR V13, V1, V13
VXOR V14, V2, V14
VXOR V15, V3, V15
VRLW V12, V27, V12
VRLW V13, V27, V13
VRLW V14, V27, V14
VRLW V15, V27, V15
VADDUWM V8, V12, V8
VADDUWM V9, V13, V9
VADDUWM V10, V14, V10
VADDUWM V11, V15, V11
VXOR V4, V8, V4
VXOR V5, V9, V5
VXOR V6, V10, V6
VXOR V7, V11, V7
VRLW V4, V28, V4
VRLW V5, V28, V5
VRLW V6, V28, V6
VRLW V7, V28, V7
VADDUWM V0, V4, V0
VADDUWM V1, V5, V1
VADDUWM V2, V6, V2
VADDUWM V3, V7, V3
VXOR V12, V0, V12
VXOR V13, V1, V13
VXOR V14, V2, V14
VXOR V15, V3, V15
VRLW V12, V29, V12
VRLW V13, V29, V13
VRLW V14, V29, V14
VRLW V15, V29, V15
VADDUWM V8, V12, V8
VADDUWM V9, V13, V9
VADDUWM V10, V14, V10
VADDUWM V11, V15, V11
VXOR V4, V8, V4
VXOR V5, V9, V5
VXOR V6, V10, V6
VXOR V7, V11, V7
VRLW V4, V30, V4
VRLW V5, V30, V5
VRLW V6, V30, V6
VRLW V7, V30, V7
VADDUWM V0, V5, V0
VADDUWM V1, V6, V1
VADDUWM V2, V7, V2
VADDUWM V3, V4, V3
VXOR V15, V0, V15
VXOR V12, V1, V12
VXOR V13, V2, V13
VXOR V14, V3, V14
VRLW V15, V27, V15
VRLW V12, V27, V12
VRLW V13, V27, V13
VRLW V14, V27, V14
VADDUWM V10, V15, V10
VADDUWM V11, V12, V11
VADDUWM V8, V13, V8
VADDUWM V9, V14, V9
VXOR V5, V10, V5
VXOR V6, V11, V6
VXOR V7, V8, V7
VXOR V4, V9, V4
VRLW V5, V28, V5
VRLW V6, V28, V6
VRLW V7, V28, V7
VRLW V4, V28, V4
VADDUWM V0, V5, V0
VADDUWM V1, V6, V1
VADDUWM V2, V7, V2
VADDUWM V3, V4, V3
VXOR V15, V0, V15
VXOR V12, V1, V12
VXOR V13, V2, V13
VXOR V14, V3, V14
VRLW V15, V29, V15
VRLW V12, V29, V12
VRLW V13, V29, V13
VRLW V14, V29, V14
VADDUWM V10, V15, V10
VADDUWM V11, V12, V11
VADDUWM V8, V13, V8
VADDUWM V9, V14, V9
VXOR V5, V10, V5
VXOR V6, V11, V6
VXOR V7, V8, V7
VXOR V4, V9, V4
VRLW V5, V30, V5
VRLW V6, V30, V6
VRLW V7, V30, V7
VRLW V4, V30, V4
BC 16, LT, loop_vsx
VADDUWM V12, V26, V12
WORD $0x13600F8C // VMRGEW V0, V1, V27
WORD $0x13821F8C // VMRGEW V2, V3, V28
WORD $0x10000E8C // VMRGOW V0, V1, V0
WORD $0x10421E8C // VMRGOW V2, V3, V2
WORD $0x13A42F8C // VMRGEW V4, V5, V29
WORD $0x13C63F8C // VMRGEW V6, V7, V30
XXPERMDI VS32, VS34, $0, VS33
XXPERMDI VS32, VS34, $3, VS35
XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $0, VS32
XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $3, VS34
WORD $0x10842E8C // VMRGOW V4, V5, V4
WORD $0x10C63E8C // VMRGOW V6, V7, V6
WORD $0x13684F8C // VMRGEW V8, V9, V27
WORD $0x138A5F8C // VMRGEW V10, V11, V28
XXPERMDI VS36, VS38, $0, VS37
XXPERMDI VS36, VS38, $3, VS39
XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $0, VS36
XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $3, VS38
WORD $0x11084E8C // VMRGOW V8, V9, V8
WORD $0x114A5E8C // VMRGOW V10, V11, V10
WORD $0x13AC6F8C // VMRGEW V12, V13, V29
WORD $0x13CE7F8C // VMRGEW V14, V15, V30
XXPERMDI VS40, VS42, $0, VS41
XXPERMDI VS40, VS42, $3, VS43
XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $0, VS40
XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $3, VS42
WORD $0x118C6E8C // VMRGOW V12, V13, V12
WORD $0x11CE7E8C // VMRGOW V14, V15, V14
VSPLTISW $4, V27
VADDUWM V26, V27, V26
XXPERMDI VS44, VS46, $0, VS45
XXPERMDI VS44, VS46, $3, VS47
XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $0, VS44
XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $3, VS46
VADDUWM V0, V16, V0
VADDUWM V4, V17, V4
VADDUWM V8, V18, V8
VADDUWM V12, V19, V12
CMPU LEN, $64
BLT tail_vsx
// Bottom of loop
LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59
LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60
LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61
LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62
VXOR V27, V0, V27
VXOR V28, V4, V28
VXOR V29, V8, V29
VXOR V30, V12, V30
STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0)
STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8)
ADD $64, INP
STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9)
ADD $-64, LEN
STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10)
ADD $64, OUT
BEQ done_vsx
VADDUWM V1, V16, V0
VADDUWM V5, V17, V4
VADDUWM V9, V18, V8
VADDUWM V13, V19, V12
CMPU LEN, $64
BLT tail_vsx
LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59
LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60
LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61
LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62
VXOR V27, V0, V27
VXOR V28, V4, V28
VXOR V29, V8, V29
VXOR V30, V12, V30
STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0)
STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8)
ADD $64, INP
STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9)
ADD $-64, LEN
STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(V10)
ADD $64, OUT
BEQ done_vsx
VADDUWM V2, V16, V0
VADDUWM V6, V17, V4
VADDUWM V10, V18, V8
VADDUWM V14, V19, V12
CMPU LEN, $64
BLT tail_vsx
LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59
LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60
LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61
LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62
VXOR V27, V0, V27
VXOR V28, V4, V28
VXOR V29, V8, V29
VXOR V30, V12, V30
STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0)
STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8)
ADD $64, INP
STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9)
ADD $-64, LEN
STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10)
ADD $64, OUT
BEQ done_vsx
VADDUWM V3, V16, V0
VADDUWM V7, V17, V4
VADDUWM V11, V18, V8
VADDUWM V15, V19, V12
CMPU LEN, $64
BLT tail_vsx
LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59
LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60
LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61
LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62
VXOR V27, V0, V27
VXOR V28, V4, V28
VXOR V29, V8, V29
VXOR V30, V12, V30
STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0)
STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8)
ADD $64, INP
STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9)
ADD $-64, LEN
STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10)
ADD $64, OUT
MOVD $10, R14
MOVD R14, CTR
BNE loop_outer_vsx
done_vsx:
// Increment counter by 4
MOVD (CNT), R14
ADD $4, R14
MOVD R14, (CNT)
RET
tail_vsx:
ADD $32, R1, R11
MOVD LEN, CTR
// Save values on stack to copy from
STXVW4X VS32, (R11)(R0)
STXVW4X VS36, (R11)(R8)
STXVW4X VS40, (R11)(R9)
STXVW4X VS44, (R11)(R10)
ADD $-1, R11, R12
ADD $-1, INP
ADD $-1, OUT
looptail_vsx:
// Copying the result to OUT
// in bytes.
MOVBZU 1(R12), KEY
MOVBZU 1(INP), TMP
XOR KEY, TMP, KEY
MOVBU KEY, 1(OUT)
BC 16, LT, looptail_vsx
// Clear the stack values
STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R0)
STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R8)
STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R9)
STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R10)
BR done_vsx
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// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.11
// +build !gccgo
package chacha20
const (
haveAsm = true
bufSize = 256
)
//go:noescape
func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32)
func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) {
if len(src) >= bufSize {
xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter)
}
if len(src)%bufSize != 0 {
i := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize
c.buf = [bufSize]byte{}
copy(c.buf[:], src[i:])
xorKeyStreamVX(c.buf[:], c.buf[:], &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter)
c.len = bufSize - copy(dst[i:], c.buf[:len(src)%bufSize])
}
}
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// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package ChaCha20 implements the core ChaCha20 function as specified
// in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539#section-2.3.
package chacha20
import (
"crypto/cipher"
"encoding/binary"
"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle"
)
// assert that *Cipher implements cipher.Stream
var _ cipher.Stream = (*Cipher)(nil)
// Cipher is a stateful instance of ChaCha20 using a particular key
// and nonce. A *Cipher implements the cipher.Stream interface.
type Cipher struct {
key [8]uint32
counter uint32 // incremented after each block
nonce [3]uint32
buf [bufSize]byte // buffer for unused keystream bytes
len int // number of unused keystream bytes at end of buf
}
// New creates a new ChaCha20 stream cipher with the given key and nonce.
// The initial counter value is set to 0.
func New(key [8]uint32, nonce [3]uint32) *Cipher {
return &Cipher{key: key, nonce: nonce}
}
// ChaCha20 constants spelling "expand 32-byte k"
const (
j0 uint32 = 0x61707865
j1 uint32 = 0x3320646e
j2 uint32 = 0x79622d32
j3 uint32 = 0x6b206574
)
func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) {
a += b
d ^= a
d = (d << 16) | (d >> 16)
c += d
b ^= c
b = (b << 12) | (b >> 20)
a += b
d ^= a
d = (d << 8) | (d >> 24)
c += d
b ^= c
b = (b << 7) | (b >> 25)
return a, b, c, d
}
// XORKeyStream XORs each byte in the given slice with a byte from the
// cipher's key stream. Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all.
//
// If len(dst) < len(src), XORKeyStream will panic. It is acceptable
// to pass a dst bigger than src, and in that case, XORKeyStream will
// only update dst[:len(src)] and will not touch the rest of dst.
//
// Multiple calls to XORKeyStream behave as if the concatenation of
// the src buffers was passed in a single run. That is, Cipher
// maintains state and does not reset at each XORKeyStream call.
func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
if len(dst) < len(src) {
panic("chacha20: output smaller than input")
}
if subtle.InexactOverlap(dst[:len(src)], src) {
panic("chacha20: invalid buffer overlap")
}
// xor src with buffered keystream first
if s.len != 0 {
buf := s.buf[len(s.buf)-s.len:]
if len(src) < len(buf) {
buf = buf[:len(src)]
}
td, ts := dst[:len(buf)], src[:len(buf)] // BCE hint
for i, b := range buf {
td[i] = ts[i] ^ b
}
s.len -= len(buf)
if s.len != 0 {
return
}
s.buf = [len(s.buf)]byte{} // zero the empty buffer
src = src[len(buf):]
dst = dst[len(buf):]
}
if len(src) == 0 {
return
}
if haveAsm {
if uint64(len(src))+uint64(s.counter)*64 > (1<<38)-64 {
panic("chacha20: counter overflow")
}
s.xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src)
return
}
// set up a 64-byte buffer to pad out the final block if needed
// (hoisted out of the main loop to avoid spills)
rem := len(src) % 64 // length of final block
fin := len(src) - rem // index of final block
if rem > 0 {
copy(s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:], src[fin:])
}
// pre-calculate most of the first round
s1, s5, s9, s13 := quarterRound(j1, s.key[1], s.key[5], s.nonce[0])
s2, s6, s10, s14 := quarterRound(j2, s.key[2], s.key[6], s.nonce[1])
s3, s7, s11, s15 := quarterRound(j3, s.key[3], s.key[7], s.nonce[2])
n := len(src)
src, dst = src[:n:n], dst[:n:n] // BCE hint
for i := 0; i < n; i += 64 {
// calculate the remainder of the first round
s0, s4, s8, s12 := quarterRound(j0, s.key[0], s.key[4], s.counter)
// execute the second round
x0, x5, x10, x15 := quarterRound(s0, s5, s10, s15)
x1, x6, x11, x12 := quarterRound(s1, s6, s11, s12)
x2, x7, x8, x13 := quarterRound(s2, s7, s8, s13)
x3, x4, x9, x14 := quarterRound(s3, s4, s9, s14)
// execute the remaining 18 rounds
for i := 0; i < 9; i++ {
x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12)
x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13)
x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14)
x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15)
x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15)
x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12)
x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13)
x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14)
}
x0 += j0
x1 += j1
x2 += j2
x3 += j3
x4 += s.key[0]
x5 += s.key[1]
x6 += s.key[2]
x7 += s.key[3]
x8 += s.key[4]
x9 += s.key[5]
x10 += s.key[6]
x11 += s.key[7]
x12 += s.counter
x13 += s.nonce[0]
x14 += s.nonce[1]
x15 += s.nonce[2]
// increment the counter
s.counter += 1
if s.counter == 0 {
panic("chacha20: counter overflow")
}
// pad to 64 bytes if needed
in, out := src[i:], dst[i:]
if i == fin {
// src[fin:] has already been copied into s.buf before
// the main loop
in, out = s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:], s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:]
}
in, out = in[:64], out[:64] // BCE hint
// XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result
xor(out[0:], in[0:], x0)
xor(out[4:], in[4:], x1)
xor(out[8:], in[8:], x2)
xor(out[12:], in[12:], x3)
xor(out[16:], in[16:], x4)
xor(out[20:], in[20:], x5)
xor(out[24:], in[24:], x6)
xor(out[28:], in[28:], x7)
xor(out[32:], in[32:], x8)
xor(out[36:], in[36:], x9)
xor(out[40:], in[40:], x10)
xor(out[44:], in[44:], x11)
xor(out[48:], in[48:], x12)
xor(out[52:], in[52:], x13)
xor(out[56:], in[56:], x14)
xor(out[60:], in[60:], x15)
}
// copy any trailing bytes out of the buffer and into dst
if rem != 0 {
s.len = 64 - rem
copy(dst[fin:], s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:])
}
}
// Advance discards bytes in the key stream until the next 64 byte block
// boundary is reached and updates the counter accordingly. If the key
// stream is already at a block boundary no bytes will be discarded and
// the counter will be unchanged.
func (s *Cipher) Advance() {
s.len -= s.len % 64
if s.len == 0 {
s.buf = [len(s.buf)]byte{}
}
}
// XORKeyStream crypts bytes from in to out using the given key and counters.
// In and out must overlap entirely or not at all. Counter contains the raw
// ChaCha20 counter bytes (i.e. block counter followed by nonce).
func XORKeyStream(out, in []byte, counter *[16]byte, key *[32]byte) {
s := Cipher{
key: [8]uint32{
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]),
},
nonce: [3]uint32{
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[4:8]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[8:12]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[12:16]),
},
counter: binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[0:4]),
}
s.XORKeyStream(out, in)
}
// HChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to generate a derived key from a key and a
// nonce. It should only be used as part of the XChaCha20 construction.
func HChaCha20(key *[8]uint32, nonce *[4]uint32) [8]uint32 {
x0, x1, x2, x3 := j0, j1, j2, j3
x4, x5, x6, x7 := key[0], key[1], key[2], key[3]
x8, x9, x10, x11 := key[4], key[5], key[6], key[7]
x12, x13, x14, x15 := nonce[0], nonce[1], nonce[2], nonce[3]
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12)
x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13)
x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14)
x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15)
x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15)
x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12)
x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13)
x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14)
}
var out [8]uint32
out[0], out[1], out[2], out[3] = x0, x1, x2, x3
out[4], out[5], out[6], out[7] = x12, x13, x14, x15
return out
}
-16
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// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !arm64,!s390x,!ppc64le arm64,!go1.11 gccgo appengine
package chacha20
const (
bufSize = 64
haveAsm = false
)
func (*Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) {
panic("not implemented")
}
-54
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// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build ppc64le,!gccgo,!appengine
package chacha20
import (
"encoding/binary"
)
const (
bufSize = 256
haveAsm = true
)
//go:noescape
func chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32)
func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) {
// This implementation can handle buffers that aren't multiples of
// 256.
if len(src) >= bufSize {
chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(&dst[0], &src[0], len(src), &c.key, &c.counter)
} else if len(src)%bufSize != 0 {
chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(&c.buf[0], &c.buf[0], bufSize, &c.key, &c.counter)
start := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize
ts, td, tb := src[start:], dst[start:], c.buf[:]
// Unroll loop to XOR 32 bytes per iteration.
for i := 0; i < len(ts)-32; i += 32 {
td, tb = td[:len(ts)], tb[:len(ts)] // bounds check elimination
s0 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(ts[0:8])
s1 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(ts[8:16])
s2 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(ts[16:24])
s3 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(ts[24:32])
b0 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(tb[0:8])
b1 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(tb[8:16])
b2 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(tb[16:24])
b3 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(tb[24:32])
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(td[0:8], s0^b0)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(td[8:16], s1^b1)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(td[16:24], s2^b2)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(td[24:32], s3^b3)
ts, td, tb = ts[32:], td[32:], tb[32:]
}
td, tb = td[:len(ts)], tb[:len(ts)] // bounds check elimination
for i, v := range ts {
td[i] = tb[i] ^ v
}
c.len = bufSize - (len(src) % bufSize)
}
}
-29
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// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build s390x,!gccgo,!appengine
package chacha20
import (
"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
)
var haveAsm = cpu.S390X.HasVX
const bufSize = 256
// xorKeyStreamVX is an assembly implementation of XORKeyStream. It must only
// be called when the vector facility is available.
// Implementation in asm_s390x.s.
//go:noescape
func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32, buf *[256]byte, len *int)
func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) {
xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter, &c.buf, &c.len)
}
// EXRL targets, DO NOT CALL!
func mvcSrcToBuf()
func mvcBufToDst()
-260
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@@ -1,260 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build s390x,!gccgo,!appengine
#include "go_asm.h"
#include "textflag.h"
// This is an implementation of the ChaCha20 encryption algorithm as
// specified in RFC 7539. It uses vector instructions to compute
// 4 keystream blocks in parallel (256 bytes) which are then XORed
// with the bytes in the input slice.
GLOBL ·constants<>(SB), RODATA|NOPTR, $32
// BSWAP: swap bytes in each 4-byte element
DATA ·constants<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x03020100
DATA ·constants<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0x07060504
DATA ·constants<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x0b0a0908
DATA ·constants<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x0f0e0d0c
// J0: [j0, j1, j2, j3]
DATA ·constants<>+0x10(SB)/4, $0x61707865
DATA ·constants<>+0x14(SB)/4, $0x3320646e
DATA ·constants<>+0x18(SB)/4, $0x79622d32
DATA ·constants<>+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574
// EXRL targets:
TEXT ·mvcSrcToBuf(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0
MVC $1, (R1), (R8)
RET
TEXT ·mvcBufToDst(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0
MVC $1, (R8), (R9)
RET
#define BSWAP V5
#define J0 V6
#define KEY0 V7
#define KEY1 V8
#define NONCE V9
#define CTR V10
#define M0 V11
#define M1 V12
#define M2 V13
#define M3 V14
#define INC V15
#define X0 V16
#define X1 V17
#define X2 V18
#define X3 V19
#define X4 V20
#define X5 V21
#define X6 V22
#define X7 V23
#define X8 V24
#define X9 V25
#define X10 V26
#define X11 V27
#define X12 V28
#define X13 V29
#define X14 V30
#define X15 V31
#define NUM_ROUNDS 20
#define ROUND4(a0, a1, a2, a3, b0, b1, b2, b3, c0, c1, c2, c3, d0, d1, d2, d3) \
VAF a1, a0, a0 \
VAF b1, b0, b0 \
VAF c1, c0, c0 \
VAF d1, d0, d0 \
VX a0, a2, a2 \
VX b0, b2, b2 \
VX c0, c2, c2 \
VX d0, d2, d2 \
VERLLF $16, a2, a2 \
VERLLF $16, b2, b2 \
VERLLF $16, c2, c2 \
VERLLF $16, d2, d2 \
VAF a2, a3, a3 \
VAF b2, b3, b3 \
VAF c2, c3, c3 \
VAF d2, d3, d3 \
VX a3, a1, a1 \
VX b3, b1, b1 \
VX c3, c1, c1 \
VX d3, d1, d1 \
VERLLF $12, a1, a1 \
VERLLF $12, b1, b1 \
VERLLF $12, c1, c1 \
VERLLF $12, d1, d1 \
VAF a1, a0, a0 \
VAF b1, b0, b0 \
VAF c1, c0, c0 \
VAF d1, d0, d0 \
VX a0, a2, a2 \
VX b0, b2, b2 \
VX c0, c2, c2 \
VX d0, d2, d2 \
VERLLF $8, a2, a2 \
VERLLF $8, b2, b2 \
VERLLF $8, c2, c2 \
VERLLF $8, d2, d2 \
VAF a2, a3, a3 \
VAF b2, b3, b3 \
VAF c2, c3, c3 \
VAF d2, d3, d3 \
VX a3, a1, a1 \
VX b3, b1, b1 \
VX c3, c1, c1 \
VX d3, d1, d1 \
VERLLF $7, a1, a1 \
VERLLF $7, b1, b1 \
VERLLF $7, c1, c1 \
VERLLF $7, d1, d1
#define PERMUTE(mask, v0, v1, v2, v3) \
VPERM v0, v0, mask, v0 \
VPERM v1, v1, mask, v1 \
VPERM v2, v2, mask, v2 \
VPERM v3, v3, mask, v3
#define ADDV(x, v0, v1, v2, v3) \
VAF x, v0, v0 \
VAF x, v1, v1 \
VAF x, v2, v2 \
VAF x, v3, v3
#define XORV(off, dst, src, v0, v1, v2, v3) \
VLM off(src), M0, M3 \
PERMUTE(BSWAP, v0, v1, v2, v3) \
VX v0, M0, M0 \
VX v1, M1, M1 \
VX v2, M2, M2 \
VX v3, M3, M3 \
VSTM M0, M3, off(dst)
#define SHUFFLE(a, b, c, d, t, u, v, w) \
VMRHF a, c, t \ // t = {a[0], c[0], a[1], c[1]}
VMRHF b, d, u \ // u = {b[0], d[0], b[1], d[1]}
VMRLF a, c, v \ // v = {a[2], c[2], a[3], c[3]}
VMRLF b, d, w \ // w = {b[2], d[2], b[3], d[3]}
VMRHF t, u, a \ // a = {a[0], b[0], c[0], d[0]}
VMRLF t, u, b \ // b = {a[1], b[1], c[1], d[1]}
VMRHF v, w, c \ // c = {a[2], b[2], c[2], d[2]}
VMRLF v, w, d // d = {a[3], b[3], c[3], d[3]}
// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32, buf *[256]byte, len *int)
TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R1
MOVD dst+0(FP), R2 // R2=&dst[0]
LMG src+24(FP), R3, R4 // R3=&src[0] R4=len(src)
MOVD key+48(FP), R5 // R5=key
MOVD nonce+56(FP), R6 // R6=nonce
MOVD counter+64(FP), R7 // R7=counter
MOVD buf+72(FP), R8 // R8=buf
MOVD len+80(FP), R9 // R9=len
// load BSWAP and J0
VLM (R1), BSWAP, J0
// set up tail buffer
ADD $-1, R4, R12
MOVBZ R12, R12
CMPUBEQ R12, $255, aligned
MOVD R4, R1
AND $~255, R1
MOVD $(R3)(R1*1), R1
EXRL $·mvcSrcToBuf(SB), R12
MOVD $255, R0
SUB R12, R0
MOVD R0, (R9) // update len
aligned:
// setup
MOVD $95, R0
VLM (R5), KEY0, KEY1
VLL R0, (R6), NONCE
VZERO M0
VLEIB $7, $32, M0
VSRLB M0, NONCE, NONCE
// initialize counter values
VLREPF (R7), CTR
VZERO INC
VLEIF $1, $1, INC
VLEIF $2, $2, INC
VLEIF $3, $3, INC
VAF INC, CTR, CTR
VREPIF $4, INC
chacha:
VREPF $0, J0, X0
VREPF $1, J0, X1
VREPF $2, J0, X2
VREPF $3, J0, X3
VREPF $0, KEY0, X4
VREPF $1, KEY0, X5
VREPF $2, KEY0, X6
VREPF $3, KEY0, X7
VREPF $0, KEY1, X8
VREPF $1, KEY1, X9
VREPF $2, KEY1, X10
VREPF $3, KEY1, X11
VLR CTR, X12
VREPF $1, NONCE, X13
VREPF $2, NONCE, X14
VREPF $3, NONCE, X15
MOVD $(NUM_ROUNDS/2), R1
loop:
ROUND4(X0, X4, X12, X8, X1, X5, X13, X9, X2, X6, X14, X10, X3, X7, X15, X11)
ROUND4(X0, X5, X15, X10, X1, X6, X12, X11, X2, X7, X13, X8, X3, X4, X14, X9)
ADD $-1, R1
BNE loop
// decrement length
ADD $-256, R4
BLT tail
continue:
// rearrange vectors
SHUFFLE(X0, X1, X2, X3, M0, M1, M2, M3)
ADDV(J0, X0, X1, X2, X3)
SHUFFLE(X4, X5, X6, X7, M0, M1, M2, M3)
ADDV(KEY0, X4, X5, X6, X7)
SHUFFLE(X8, X9, X10, X11, M0, M1, M2, M3)
ADDV(KEY1, X8, X9, X10, X11)
VAF CTR, X12, X12
SHUFFLE(X12, X13, X14, X15, M0, M1, M2, M3)
ADDV(NONCE, X12, X13, X14, X15)
// increment counters
VAF INC, CTR, CTR
// xor keystream with plaintext
XORV(0*64, R2, R3, X0, X4, X8, X12)
XORV(1*64, R2, R3, X1, X5, X9, X13)
XORV(2*64, R2, R3, X2, X6, X10, X14)
XORV(3*64, R2, R3, X3, X7, X11, X15)
// increment pointers
MOVD $256(R2), R2
MOVD $256(R3), R3
CMPBNE R4, $0, chacha
CMPUBEQ R12, $255, return
EXRL $·mvcBufToDst(SB), R12 // len was updated during setup
return:
VSTEF $0, CTR, (R7)
RET
tail:
MOVD R2, R9
MOVD R8, R2
MOVD R8, R3
MOVD $0, R4
JMP continue
-43
View File
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found src the LICENSE file.
package chacha20
import (
"runtime"
)
// Platforms that have fast unaligned 32-bit little endian accesses.
const unaligned = runtime.GOARCH == "386" ||
runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" ||
runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" ||
runtime.GOARCH == "ppc64le" ||
runtime.GOARCH == "s390x"
// xor reads a little endian uint32 from src, XORs it with u and
// places the result in little endian byte order in dst.
func xor(dst, src []byte, u uint32) {
_, _ = src[3], dst[3] // eliminate bounds checks
if unaligned {
// The compiler should optimize this code into
// 32-bit unaligned little endian loads and stores.
// TODO: delete once the compiler does a reliably
// good job with the generic code below.
// See issue #25111 for more details.
v := uint32(src[0])
v |= uint32(src[1]) << 8
v |= uint32(src[2]) << 16
v |= uint32(src[3]) << 24
v ^= u
dst[0] = byte(v)
dst[1] = byte(v >> 8)
dst[2] = byte(v >> 16)
dst[3] = byte(v >> 24)
} else {
dst[0] = src[0] ^ byte(u)
dst[1] = src[1] ^ byte(u>>8)
dst[2] = src[2] ^ byte(u>>16)
dst[3] = src[3] ^ byte(u>>24)
}
}
+8 -2
View File
@@ -22,8 +22,14 @@ import "crypto/subtle"
// TagSize is the size, in bytes, of a poly1305 authenticator.
const TagSize = 16
// Verify returns true if mac is a valid authenticator for m with the given
// key.
// Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
sum(out, m, key)
}
// Verify returns true if mac is a valid authenticator for m with the given key.
func Verify(mac *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) bool {
var tmp [16]byte
Sum(&tmp, m, key)
+23 -33
View File
@@ -7,62 +7,52 @@
package poly1305
//go:noescape
func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte)
func update(state *macState, msg []byte)
//go:noescape
func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte)
//go:noescape
func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64)
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
h := newMAC(key)
h.Write(m)
h.Sum(out)
}
func newMAC(key *[32]byte) (h mac) {
initialize(&h.state, key)
initialize(key, &h.r, &h.s)
return
}
type mac struct {
state [7]uint64 // := uint64{ h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, pad0, pad1 }
// mac is a wrapper for macGeneric that redirects calls that would have gone to
// updateGeneric to update.
//
// Its Write and Sum methods are otherwise identical to the macGeneric ones, but
// using function pointers would carry a major performance cost.
type mac struct{ macGeneric }
buffer [TagSize]byte
offset int
}
func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
n = len(p)
func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
nn := len(p)
if h.offset > 0 {
remaining := TagSize - h.offset
if n < remaining {
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
return n, nil
n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
if h.offset+n < TagSize {
h.offset += n
return nn, nil
}
copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p[:remaining])
p = p[remaining:]
p = p[n:]
h.offset = 0
update(&h.state, h.buffer[:])
update(&h.macState, h.buffer[:])
}
if nn := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); nn > 0 {
update(&h.state, p[:nn])
p = p[nn:]
if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 {
update(&h.macState, p[:n])
p = p[n:]
}
if len(p) > 0 {
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
}
return n, nil
return nn, nil
}
func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) {
state := h.state
state := h.macState
if h.offset > 0 {
update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset])
}
finalize(out, &state)
finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s)
}
-40
View File
@@ -54,10 +54,6 @@
ADCQ t3, h1; \
ADCQ $0, h2
DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF
DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC
GLOBL ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), RODATA, $16
// func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte)
TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32
MOVQ state+0(FP), DI
@@ -110,39 +106,3 @@ done:
MOVQ R9, 8(DI)
MOVQ R10, 16(DI)
RET
// func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte)
TEXT ·initialize(SB), $0-16
MOVQ state+0(FP), DI
MOVQ key+8(FP), SI
// state[0...7] is initialized with zero
MOVOU 0(SI), X0
MOVOU 16(SI), X1
MOVOU ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), X2
PAND X2, X0
MOVOU X0, 24(DI)
MOVOU X1, 40(DI)
RET
// func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64)
TEXT ·finalize(SB), $0-16
MOVQ tag+0(FP), DI
MOVQ state+8(FP), SI
MOVQ 0(SI), AX
MOVQ 8(SI), BX
MOVQ 16(SI), CX
MOVQ AX, R8
MOVQ BX, R9
SUBQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFB, AX
SBBQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, BX
SBBQ $3, CX
CMOVQCS R8, AX
CMOVQCS R9, BX
ADDQ 40(SI), AX
ADCQ 48(SI), BX
MOVQ AX, 0(DI)
MOVQ BX, 8(DI)
RET
-22
View File
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build arm,!gccgo,!appengine,!nacl
package poly1305
// This function is implemented in sum_arm.s
//go:noescape
func poly1305_auth_armv6(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint32, key *[32]byte)
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
var mPtr *byte
if len(m) > 0 {
mPtr = &m[0]
}
poly1305_auth_armv6(out, mPtr, uint32(len(m)), key)
}
-427
View File
@@ -1,427 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build arm,!gccgo,!appengine,!nacl
#include "textflag.h"
// This code was translated into a form compatible with 5a from the public
// domain source by Andrew Moon: github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-opt/blob/master/app/extensions/poly1305.
DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x3ffffff
DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0x3ffff03
DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x3ffc0ff
DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x3f03fff
DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x10(SB)/4, $0x00fffff
GLOBL ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>(SB), 8, $20
// Warning: the linker may use R11 to synthesize certain instructions. Please
// take care and verify that no synthetic instructions use it.
TEXT poly1305_init_ext_armv6<>(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
// Needs 16 bytes of stack and 64 bytes of space pointed to by R0. (It
// might look like it's only 60 bytes of space but the final four bytes
// will be written by another function.) We need to skip over four
// bytes of stack because that's saving the value of 'g'.
ADD $4, R13, R8
MOVM.IB [R4-R7], (R8)
MOVM.IA.W (R1), [R2-R5]
MOVW $·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>(SB), R7
MOVW R2, R8
MOVW R2>>26, R9
MOVW R3>>20, g
MOVW R4>>14, R11
MOVW R5>>8, R12
ORR R3<<6, R9, R9
ORR R4<<12, g, g
ORR R5<<18, R11, R11
MOVM.IA (R7), [R2-R6]
AND R8, R2, R2
AND R9, R3, R3
AND g, R4, R4
AND R11, R5, R5
AND R12, R6, R6
MOVM.IA.W [R2-R6], (R0)
EOR R2, R2, R2
EOR R3, R3, R3
EOR R4, R4, R4
EOR R5, R5, R5
EOR R6, R6, R6
MOVM.IA.W [R2-R6], (R0)
MOVM.IA.W (R1), [R2-R5]
MOVM.IA [R2-R6], (R0)
ADD $20, R13, R0
MOVM.DA (R0), [R4-R7]
RET
#define MOVW_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp, offset) \
MOVBU (offset+0)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+0)(Rdst); \
MOVBU (offset+1)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+1)(Rdst); \
MOVBU (offset+2)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+2)(Rdst); \
MOVBU (offset+3)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+3)(Rdst)
TEXT poly1305_blocks_armv6<>(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
// Needs 24 bytes of stack for saved registers and then 88 bytes of
// scratch space after that. We assume that 24 bytes at (R13) have
// already been used: four bytes for the link register saved in the
// prelude of poly1305_auth_armv6, four bytes for saving the value of g
// in that function and 16 bytes of scratch space used around
// poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip1.
ADD $24, R13, R12
MOVM.IB [R4-R8, R14], (R12)
MOVW R0, 88(R13)
MOVW R1, 92(R13)
MOVW R2, 96(R13)
MOVW R1, R14
MOVW R2, R12
MOVW 56(R0), R8
WORD $0xe1180008 // TST R8, R8 not working see issue 5921
EOR R6, R6, R6
MOVW.EQ $(1<<24), R6
MOVW R6, 84(R13)
ADD $116, R13, g
MOVM.IA (R0), [R0-R9]
MOVM.IA [R0-R4], (g)
CMP $16, R12
BLO poly1305_blocks_armv6_done
poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop:
WORD $0xe31e0003 // TST R14, #3 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_aligned
ADD $100, R13, g
MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 0)
MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 4)
MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 8)
MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 12)
MOVM.IA (g), [R0-R3]
ADD $16, R14
B poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_loaded
poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_aligned:
MOVM.IA.W (R14), [R0-R3]
poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_loaded:
MOVW R0>>26, g
MOVW R1>>20, R11
MOVW R2>>14, R12
MOVW R14, 92(R13)
MOVW R3>>8, R4
ORR R1<<6, g, g
ORR R2<<12, R11, R11
ORR R3<<18, R12, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R0, R0
BIC $0xfc000000, g, g
MOVW 84(R13), R3
BIC $0xfc000000, R11, R11
BIC $0xfc000000, R12, R12
ADD R0, R5, R5
ADD g, R6, R6
ORR R3, R4, R4
ADD R11, R7, R7
ADD $116, R13, R14
ADD R12, R8, R8
ADD R4, R9, R9
MOVM.IA (R14), [R0-R4]
MULLU R4, R5, (R11, g)
MULLU R3, R5, (R14, R12)
MULALU R3, R6, (R11, g)
MULALU R2, R6, (R14, R12)
MULALU R2, R7, (R11, g)
MULALU R1, R7, (R14, R12)
ADD R4<<2, R4, R4
ADD R3<<2, R3, R3
MULALU R1, R8, (R11, g)
MULALU R0, R8, (R14, R12)
MULALU R0, R9, (R11, g)
MULALU R4, R9, (R14, R12)
MOVW g, 76(R13)
MOVW R11, 80(R13)
MOVW R12, 68(R13)
MOVW R14, 72(R13)
MULLU R2, R5, (R11, g)
MULLU R1, R5, (R14, R12)
MULALU R1, R6, (R11, g)
MULALU R0, R6, (R14, R12)
MULALU R0, R7, (R11, g)
MULALU R4, R7, (R14, R12)
ADD R2<<2, R2, R2
ADD R1<<2, R1, R1
MULALU R4, R8, (R11, g)
MULALU R3, R8, (R14, R12)
MULALU R3, R9, (R11, g)
MULALU R2, R9, (R14, R12)
MOVW g, 60(R13)
MOVW R11, 64(R13)
MOVW R12, 52(R13)
MOVW R14, 56(R13)
MULLU R0, R5, (R11, g)
MULALU R4, R6, (R11, g)
MULALU R3, R7, (R11, g)
MULALU R2, R8, (R11, g)
MULALU R1, R9, (R11, g)
ADD $52, R13, R0
MOVM.IA (R0), [R0-R7]
MOVW g>>26, R12
MOVW R4>>26, R14
ORR R11<<6, R12, R12
ORR R5<<6, R14, R14
BIC $0xfc000000, g, g
BIC $0xfc000000, R4, R4
ADD.S R12, R0, R0
ADC $0, R1, R1
ADD.S R14, R6, R6
ADC $0, R7, R7
MOVW R0>>26, R12
MOVW R6>>26, R14
ORR R1<<6, R12, R12
ORR R7<<6, R14, R14
BIC $0xfc000000, R0, R0
BIC $0xfc000000, R6, R6
ADD R14<<2, R14, R14
ADD.S R12, R2, R2
ADC $0, R3, R3
ADD R14, g, g
MOVW R2>>26, R12
MOVW g>>26, R14
ORR R3<<6, R12, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, g, R5
BIC $0xfc000000, R2, R7
ADD R12, R4, R4
ADD R14, R0, R0
MOVW R4>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R4, R8
ADD R12, R6, R9
MOVW 96(R13), R12
MOVW 92(R13), R14
MOVW R0, R6
CMP $32, R12
SUB $16, R12, R12
MOVW R12, 96(R13)
BHS poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop
poly1305_blocks_armv6_done:
MOVW 88(R13), R12
MOVW R5, 20(R12)
MOVW R6, 24(R12)
MOVW R7, 28(R12)
MOVW R8, 32(R12)
MOVW R9, 36(R12)
ADD $48, R13, R0
MOVM.DA (R0), [R4-R8, R14]
RET
#define MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp) \
MOVBU.P 1(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
MOVBU.P Rtmp, 1(Rdst); \
MOVBU.P 1(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
MOVBU.P Rtmp, 1(Rdst)
#define MOVWP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp) \
MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp); \
MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp)
// func poly1305_auth_armv6(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint32, key *[32]key)
TEXT ·poly1305_auth_armv6(SB), $196-16
// The value 196, just above, is the sum of 64 (the size of the context
// structure) and 132 (the amount of stack needed).
//
// At this point, the stack pointer (R13) has been moved down. It
// points to the saved link register and there's 196 bytes of free
// space above it.
//
// The stack for this function looks like:
//
// +---------------------
// |
// | 64 bytes of context structure
// |
// +---------------------
// |
// | 112 bytes for poly1305_blocks_armv6
// |
// +---------------------
// | 16 bytes of final block, constructed at
// | poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8
// +---------------------
// | four bytes of saved 'g'
// +---------------------
// | lr, saved by prelude <- R13 points here
// +---------------------
MOVW g, 4(R13)
MOVW out+0(FP), R4
MOVW m+4(FP), R5
MOVW mlen+8(FP), R6
MOVW key+12(FP), R7
ADD $136, R13, R0 // 136 = 4 + 4 + 16 + 112
MOVW R7, R1
// poly1305_init_ext_armv6 will write to the stack from R13+4, but
// that's ok because none of the other values have been written yet.
BL poly1305_init_ext_armv6<>(SB)
BIC.S $15, R6, R2
BEQ poly1305_auth_armv6_noblocks
ADD $136, R13, R0
MOVW R5, R1
ADD R2, R5, R5
SUB R2, R6, R6
BL poly1305_blocks_armv6<>(SB)
poly1305_auth_armv6_noblocks:
ADD $136, R13, R0
MOVW R5, R1
MOVW R6, R2
MOVW R4, R3
MOVW R0, R5
MOVW R1, R6
MOVW R2, R7
MOVW R3, R8
AND.S R2, R2, R2
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_noremaining
EOR R0, R0
ADD $8, R13, R9 // 8 = offset to 16 byte scratch space
MOVW R0, (R9)
MOVW R0, 4(R9)
MOVW R0, 8(R9)
MOVW R0, 12(R9)
WORD $0xe3110003 // TST R1, #3 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_aligned
WORD $0xe3120008 // TST R2, #8 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8
MOVWP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g)
MOVWP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g)
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8:
WORD $0xe3120004 // TST $4, R2 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4
MOVWP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g)
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4:
WORD $0xe3120002 // TST $2, R2 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2
MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g)
B poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_aligned:
WORD $0xe3120008 // TST R2, #8 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8_aligned
MOVM.IA.W (R1), [g-R11]
MOVM.IA.W [g-R11], (R9)
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8_aligned:
WORD $0xe3120004 // TST $4, R2 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4_aligned
MOVW.P 4(R1), g
MOVW.P g, 4(R9)
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4_aligned:
WORD $0xe3120002 // TST $2, R2 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2
MOVHU.P 2(R1), g
MOVH.P g, 2(R9)
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2:
WORD $0xe3120001 // TST $1, R2 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip1
MOVBU.P 1(R1), g
MOVBU.P g, 1(R9)
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip1:
MOVW $1, R11
MOVBU R11, 0(R9)
MOVW R11, 56(R5)
MOVW R5, R0
ADD $8, R13, R1
MOVW $16, R2
BL poly1305_blocks_armv6<>(SB)
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_noremaining:
MOVW 20(R5), R0
MOVW 24(R5), R1
MOVW 28(R5), R2
MOVW 32(R5), R3
MOVW 36(R5), R4
MOVW R4>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R4, R4
ADD R12<<2, R12, R12
ADD R12, R0, R0
MOVW R0>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R0, R0
ADD R12, R1, R1
MOVW R1>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R1, R1
ADD R12, R2, R2
MOVW R2>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R2, R2
ADD R12, R3, R3
MOVW R3>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R3, R3
ADD R12, R4, R4
ADD $5, R0, R6
MOVW R6>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R6, R6
ADD R12, R1, R7
MOVW R7>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R7, R7
ADD R12, R2, g
MOVW g>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, g, g
ADD R12, R3, R11
MOVW $-(1<<26), R12
ADD R11>>26, R12, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R11, R11
ADD R12, R4, R9
MOVW R9>>31, R12
SUB $1, R12
AND R12, R6, R6
AND R12, R7, R7
AND R12, g, g
AND R12, R11, R11
AND R12, R9, R9
MVN R12, R12
AND R12, R0, R0
AND R12, R1, R1
AND R12, R2, R2
AND R12, R3, R3
AND R12, R4, R4
ORR R6, R0, R0
ORR R7, R1, R1
ORR g, R2, R2
ORR R11, R3, R3
ORR R9, R4, R4
ORR R1<<26, R0, R0
MOVW R1>>6, R1
ORR R2<<20, R1, R1
MOVW R2>>12, R2
ORR R3<<14, R2, R2
MOVW R3>>18, R3
ORR R4<<8, R3, R3
MOVW 40(R5), R6
MOVW 44(R5), R7
MOVW 48(R5), g
MOVW 52(R5), R11
ADD.S R6, R0, R0
ADC.S R7, R1, R1
ADC.S g, R2, R2
ADC.S R11, R3, R3
MOVM.IA [R0-R3], (R8)
MOVW R5, R12
EOR R0, R0, R0
EOR R1, R1, R1
EOR R2, R2, R2
EOR R3, R3, R3
EOR R4, R4, R4
EOR R5, R5, R5
EOR R6, R6, R6
EOR R7, R7, R7
MOVM.IA.W [R0-R7], (R12)
MOVM.IA [R0-R7], (R12)
MOVW 4(R13), g
RET
+252 -117
View File
@@ -2,18 +2,29 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// This file provides the generic implementation of Sum and MAC. Other files
// might provide optimized assembly implementations of some of this code.
package poly1305
import "encoding/binary"
const (
msgBlock = uint32(1 << 24)
finalBlock = uint32(0)
)
// Poly1305 [RFC 7539] is a relatively simple algorithm: the authentication tag
// for a 64 bytes message is approximately
//
// s + m[0:16] * r⁴ + m[16:32] * r³ + m[32:48] * r² + m[48:64] * r mod 2¹³⁰ - 5
//
// for some secret r and s. It can be computed sequentially like
//
// for len(msg) > 0:
// h += read(msg, 16)
// h *= r
// h %= 2¹³⁰ - 5
// return h + s
//
// All the complexity is about doing performant constant-time math on numbers
// larger than any available numeric type.
// sumGeneric generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and
// puts the 16-byte result into out. This is the generic implementation of
// Sum and should be called if no assembly implementation is available.
func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
h := newMACGeneric(key)
h.Write(msg)
@@ -21,152 +32,276 @@ func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
}
func newMACGeneric(key *[32]byte) (h macGeneric) {
h.r[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:]) & 0x3ffffff
h.r[1] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03
h.r[2] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff
h.r[3] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff
h.r[4] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:]) >> 8) & 0x00fffff
h.s[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:])
h.s[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:])
h.s[2] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:])
h.s[3] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:])
initialize(key, &h.r, &h.s)
return
}
// macState holds numbers in saturated 64-bit little-endian limbs. That is,
// the value of [x0, x1, x2] is x[0] + x[1] * 2⁶⁴ + x[2] * 2¹²⁸.
type macState struct {
// h is the main accumulator. It is to be interpreted modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5, but
// can grow larger during and after rounds.
h [3]uint64
// r and s are the private key components.
r [2]uint64
s [2]uint64
}
type macGeneric struct {
h, r [5]uint32
s [4]uint32
macState
buffer [TagSize]byte
offset int
}
func (h *macGeneric) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
n = len(p)
// Write splits the incoming message into TagSize chunks, and passes them to
// update. It buffers incomplete chunks.
func (h *macGeneric) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
nn := len(p)
if h.offset > 0 {
remaining := TagSize - h.offset
if n < remaining {
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
return n, nil
n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
if h.offset+n < TagSize {
h.offset += n
return nn, nil
}
copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p[:remaining])
p = p[remaining:]
p = p[n:]
h.offset = 0
updateGeneric(h.buffer[:], msgBlock, &(h.h), &(h.r))
updateGeneric(&h.macState, h.buffer[:])
}
if nn := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); nn > 0 {
updateGeneric(p, msgBlock, &(h.h), &(h.r))
p = p[nn:]
if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 {
updateGeneric(&h.macState, p[:n])
p = p[n:]
}
if len(p) > 0 {
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
}
return n, nil
return nn, nil
}
func (h *macGeneric) Sum(out *[16]byte) {
H, R := h.h, h.r
// Sum flushes the last incomplete chunk from the buffer, if any, and generates
// the MAC output. It does not modify its state, in order to allow for multiple
// calls to Sum, even if no Write is allowed after Sum.
func (h *macGeneric) Sum(out *[TagSize]byte) {
state := h.macState
if h.offset > 0 {
var buffer [TagSize]byte
copy(buffer[:], h.buffer[:h.offset])
buffer[h.offset] = 1 // invariant: h.offset < TagSize
updateGeneric(buffer[:], finalBlock, &H, &R)
updateGeneric(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset])
}
finalizeGeneric(out, &H, &(h.s))
finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s)
}
func updateGeneric(msg []byte, flag uint32, h, r *[5]uint32) {
h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 := h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4]
r0, r1, r2, r3, r4 := uint64(r[0]), uint64(r[1]), uint64(r[2]), uint64(r[3]), uint64(r[4])
R1, R2, R3, R4 := r1*5, r2*5, r3*5, r4*5
// [rMask0, rMask1] is the specified Poly1305 clamping mask in little-endian. It
// clears some bits of the secret coefficient to make it possible to implement
// multiplication more efficiently.
const (
rMask0 = 0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF
rMask1 = 0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC
)
for len(msg) >= TagSize {
// h += msg
h0 += binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[0:]) & 0x3ffffff
h1 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff
h2 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff
h3 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff
h4 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[12:]) >> 8) | flag
func initialize(key *[32]byte, r, s *[2]uint64) {
r[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[0:8]) & rMask0
r[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[8:16]) & rMask1
s[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[16:24])
s[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[24:32])
}
// h *= r
d0 := (uint64(h0) * r0) + (uint64(h1) * R4) + (uint64(h2) * R3) + (uint64(h3) * R2) + (uint64(h4) * R1)
d1 := (d0 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r1) + (uint64(h1) * r0) + (uint64(h2) * R4) + (uint64(h3) * R3) + (uint64(h4) * R2)
d2 := (d1 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r2) + (uint64(h1) * r1) + (uint64(h2) * r0) + (uint64(h3) * R4) + (uint64(h4) * R3)
d3 := (d2 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r3) + (uint64(h1) * r2) + (uint64(h2) * r1) + (uint64(h3) * r0) + (uint64(h4) * R4)
d4 := (d3 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r4) + (uint64(h1) * r3) + (uint64(h2) * r2) + (uint64(h3) * r1) + (uint64(h4) * r0)
// uint128 holds a 128-bit number as two 64-bit limbs, for use with the
// bits.Mul64 and bits.Add64 intrinsics.
type uint128 struct {
lo, hi uint64
}
// h %= p
h0 = uint32(d0) & 0x3ffffff
h1 = uint32(d1) & 0x3ffffff
h2 = uint32(d2) & 0x3ffffff
h3 = uint32(d3) & 0x3ffffff
h4 = uint32(d4) & 0x3ffffff
func mul64(a, b uint64) uint128 {
hi, lo := bitsMul64(a, b)
return uint128{lo, hi}
}
h0 += uint32(d4>>26) * 5
h1 += h0 >> 26
h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff
func add128(a, b uint128) uint128 {
lo, c := bitsAdd64(a.lo, b.lo, 0)
hi, c := bitsAdd64(a.hi, b.hi, c)
if c != 0 {
panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow")
}
return uint128{lo, hi}
}
msg = msg[TagSize:]
func shiftRightBy2(a uint128) uint128 {
a.lo = a.lo>>2 | (a.hi&3)<<62
a.hi = a.hi >> 2
return a
}
// updateGeneric absorbs msg into the state.h accumulator. For each chunk m of
// 128 bits of message, it computes
//
// h₊ = (h + m) * r mod 2¹³⁰ - 5
//
// If the msg length is not a multiple of TagSize, it assumes the last
// incomplete chunk is the final one.
func updateGeneric(state *macState, msg []byte) {
h0, h1, h2 := state.h[0], state.h[1], state.h[2]
r0, r1 := state.r[0], state.r[1]
for len(msg) > 0 {
var c uint64
// For the first step, h + m, we use a chain of bits.Add64 intrinsics.
// The resulting value of h might exceed 2¹³⁰ - 5, but will be partially
// reduced at the end of the multiplication below.
//
// The spec requires us to set a bit just above the message size, not to
// hide leading zeroes. For full chunks, that's 1 << 128, so we can just
// add 1 to the most significant (2¹²⁸) limb, h2.
if len(msg) >= TagSize {
h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(msg[0:8]), 0)
h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(msg[8:16]), c)
h2 += c + 1
msg = msg[TagSize:]
} else {
var buf [TagSize]byte
copy(buf[:], msg)
buf[len(msg)] = 1
h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[0:8]), 0)
h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[8:16]), c)
h2 += c
msg = nil
}
// Multiplication of big number limbs is similar to elementary school
// columnar multiplication. Instead of digits, there are 64-bit limbs.
//
// We are multiplying a 3 limbs number, h, by a 2 limbs number, r.
//
// h2 h1 h0 x
// r1 r0 =
// ----------------
// h2r0 h1r0 h0r0 <-- individual 128-bit products
// + h2r1 h1r1 h0r1
// ------------------------
// m3 m2 m1 m0 <-- result in 128-bit overlapping limbs
// ------------------------
// m3.hi m2.hi m1.hi m0.hi <-- carry propagation
// + m3.lo m2.lo m1.lo m0.lo
// -------------------------------
// t4 t3 t2 t1 t0 <-- final result in 64-bit limbs
//
// The main difference from pen-and-paper multiplication is that we do
// carry propagation in a separate step, as if we wrote two digit sums
// at first (the 128-bit limbs), and then carried the tens all at once.
h0r0 := mul64(h0, r0)
h1r0 := mul64(h1, r0)
h2r0 := mul64(h2, r0)
h0r1 := mul64(h0, r1)
h1r1 := mul64(h1, r1)
h2r1 := mul64(h2, r1)
// Since h2 is known to be at most 7 (5 + 1 + 1), and r0 and r1 have their
// top 4 bits cleared by rMask{0,1}, we know that their product is not going
// to overflow 64 bits, so we can ignore the high part of the products.
//
// This also means that the product doesn't have a fifth limb (t4).
if h2r0.hi != 0 {
panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow")
}
if h2r1.hi != 0 {
panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow")
}
m0 := h0r0
m1 := add128(h1r0, h0r1) // These two additions don't overflow thanks again
m2 := add128(h2r0, h1r1) // to the 4 masked bits at the top of r0 and r1.
m3 := h2r1
t0 := m0.lo
t1, c := bitsAdd64(m1.lo, m0.hi, 0)
t2, c := bitsAdd64(m2.lo, m1.hi, c)
t3, _ := bitsAdd64(m3.lo, m2.hi, c)
// Now we have the result as 4 64-bit limbs, and we need to reduce it
// modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5. The special shape of this Crandall prime lets us do
// a cheap partial reduction according to the reduction identity
//
// c * 2¹³⁰ + n = c * 5 + n mod 2¹³⁰ - 5
//
// because 2¹³⁰ = 5 mod 2¹³⁰ - 5. Partial reduction since the result is
// likely to be larger than 2¹³⁰ - 5, but still small enough to fit the
// assumptions we make about h in the rest of the code.
//
// See also https://speakerdeck.com/gtank/engineering-prime-numbers?slide=23
// We split the final result at the 2¹³⁰ mark into h and cc, the carry.
// Note that the carry bits are effectively shifted left by 2, in other
// words, cc = c * 4 for the c in the reduction identity.
h0, h1, h2 = t0, t1, t2&maskLow2Bits
cc := uint128{t2 & maskNotLow2Bits, t3}
// To add c * 5 to h, we first add cc = c * 4, and then add (cc >> 2) = c.
h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, cc.lo, 0)
h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, cc.hi, c)
h2 += c
cc = shiftRightBy2(cc)
h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, cc.lo, 0)
h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, cc.hi, c)
h2 += c
// h2 is at most 3 + 1 + 1 = 5, making the whole of h at most
//
// 5 * 2¹²⁸ + (2¹²⁸ - 1) = 6 * 2¹²⁸ - 1
}
h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4] = h0, h1, h2, h3, h4
state.h[0], state.h[1], state.h[2] = h0, h1, h2
}
func finalizeGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, h *[5]uint32, s *[4]uint32) {
h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 := h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4]
const (
maskLow2Bits uint64 = 0x0000000000000003
maskNotLow2Bits uint64 = ^maskLow2Bits
)
// h %= p reduction
h2 += h1 >> 26
h1 &= 0x3ffffff
h3 += h2 >> 26
h2 &= 0x3ffffff
h4 += h3 >> 26
h3 &= 0x3ffffff
h0 += 5 * (h4 >> 26)
h4 &= 0x3ffffff
h1 += h0 >> 26
h0 &= 0x3ffffff
// select64 returns x if v == 1 and y if v == 0, in constant time.
func select64(v, x, y uint64) uint64 { return ^(v-1)&x | (v-1)&y }
// h - p
t0 := h0 + 5
t1 := h1 + (t0 >> 26)
t2 := h2 + (t1 >> 26)
t3 := h3 + (t2 >> 26)
t4 := h4 + (t3 >> 26) - (1 << 26)
t0 &= 0x3ffffff
t1 &= 0x3ffffff
t2 &= 0x3ffffff
t3 &= 0x3ffffff
// [p0, p1, p2] is 2¹³⁰ - 5 in little endian order.
const (
p0 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFB
p1 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
p2 = 0x0000000000000003
)
// select h if h < p else h - p
t_mask := (t4 >> 31) - 1
h_mask := ^t_mask
h0 = (h0 & h_mask) | (t0 & t_mask)
h1 = (h1 & h_mask) | (t1 & t_mask)
h2 = (h2 & h_mask) | (t2 & t_mask)
h3 = (h3 & h_mask) | (t3 & t_mask)
h4 = (h4 & h_mask) | (t4 & t_mask)
// finalize completes the modular reduction of h and computes
//
// out = h + s mod 2¹²⁸
//
func finalize(out *[TagSize]byte, h *[3]uint64, s *[2]uint64) {
h0, h1, h2 := h[0], h[1], h[2]
// h %= 2^128
h0 |= h1 << 26
h1 = ((h1 >> 6) | (h2 << 20))
h2 = ((h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14))
h3 = ((h3 >> 18) | (h4 << 8))
// After the partial reduction in updateGeneric, h might be more than
// 2¹³⁰ - 5, but will be less than 2 * (2¹³⁰ - 5). To complete the reduction
// in constant time, we compute t = h - (2¹³⁰ - 5), and select h as the
// result if the subtraction underflows, and t otherwise.
// s: the s part of the key
// tag = (h + s) % (2^128)
t := uint64(h0) + uint64(s[0])
h0 = uint32(t)
t = uint64(h1) + uint64(s[1]) + (t >> 32)
h1 = uint32(t)
t = uint64(h2) + uint64(s[2]) + (t >> 32)
h2 = uint32(t)
t = uint64(h3) + uint64(s[3]) + (t >> 32)
h3 = uint32(t)
hMinusP0, b := bitsSub64(h0, p0, 0)
hMinusP1, b := bitsSub64(h1, p1, b)
_, b = bitsSub64(h2, p2, b)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:], h0)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[4:], h1)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[8:], h2)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[12:], h3)
// h = h if h < p else h - p
h0 = select64(b, h0, hMinusP0)
h1 = select64(b, h1, hMinusP1)
// Finally, we compute the last Poly1305 step
//
// tag = h + s mod 2¹²⁸
//
// by just doing a wide addition with the 128 low bits of h and discarding
// the overflow.
h0, c := bitsAdd64(h0, s[0], 0)
h1, _ = bitsAdd64(h1, s[1], c)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(out[0:8], h0)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(out[8:16], h1)
}
+2 -5
View File
@@ -2,14 +2,11 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build s390x,!go1.11 !arm,!amd64,!s390x,!ppc64le gccgo appengine nacl
// +build s390x,!go1.11 !amd64,!s390x,!ppc64le gccgo appengine nacl
package poly1305
// Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
func sum(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
h := newMAC(key)
h.Write(msg)
h.Sum(out)
+23 -33
View File
@@ -7,62 +7,52 @@
package poly1305
//go:noescape
func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte)
func update(state *macState, msg []byte)
//go:noescape
func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte)
//go:noescape
func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64)
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
h := newMAC(key)
h.Write(m)
h.Sum(out)
}
func newMAC(key *[32]byte) (h mac) {
initialize(&h.state, key)
initialize(key, &h.r, &h.s)
return
}
type mac struct {
state [7]uint64 // := uint64{ h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, pad0, pad1 }
// mac is a wrapper for macGeneric that redirects calls that would have gone to
// updateGeneric to update.
//
// Its Write and Sum methods are otherwise identical to the macGeneric ones, but
// using function pointers would carry a major performance cost.
type mac struct{ macGeneric }
buffer [TagSize]byte
offset int
}
func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
n = len(p)
func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
nn := len(p)
if h.offset > 0 {
remaining := TagSize - h.offset
if n < remaining {
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
return n, nil
n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
if h.offset+n < TagSize {
h.offset += n
return nn, nil
}
copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p[:remaining])
p = p[remaining:]
p = p[n:]
h.offset = 0
update(&h.state, h.buffer[:])
update(&h.macState, h.buffer[:])
}
if nn := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); nn > 0 {
update(&h.state, p[:nn])
p = p[nn:]
if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 {
update(&h.macState, p[:n])
p = p[n:]
}
if len(p) > 0 {
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
}
return n, nil
return nn, nil
}
func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) {
state := h.state
state := h.macState
if h.offset > 0 {
update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset])
}
finalize(out, &state)
finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s)
}
-66
View File
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC
GLOBL ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), RODATA, $16
// func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte)
TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32
MOVD state+0(FP), R3
MOVD msg_base+8(FP), R4
@@ -180,68 +179,3 @@ done:
MOVD R9, 8(R3)
MOVD R10, 16(R3)
RET
// func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte)
TEXT ·initialize(SB), $0-16
MOVD state+0(FP), R3
MOVD key+8(FP), R4
// state[0...7] is initialized with zero
// Load key
MOVD 0(R4), R5
MOVD 8(R4), R6
MOVD 16(R4), R7
MOVD 24(R4), R8
// Address of key mask
MOVD $·poly1305Mask<>(SB), R9
// Save original key in state
MOVD R7, 40(R3)
MOVD R8, 48(R3)
// Get mask
MOVD (R9), R7
MOVD 8(R9), R8
// And with key
AND R5, R7, R5
AND R6, R8, R6
// Save masked key in state
MOVD R5, 24(R3)
MOVD R6, 32(R3)
RET
// func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64)
TEXT ·finalize(SB), $0-16
MOVD tag+0(FP), R3
MOVD state+8(FP), R4
// Get h0, h1, h2 from state
MOVD 0(R4), R5
MOVD 8(R4), R6
MOVD 16(R4), R7
// Save h0, h1
MOVD R5, R8
MOVD R6, R9
MOVD $3, R20
MOVD $-1, R21
SUBC $-5, R5
SUBE R21, R6
SUBE R20, R7
MOVD $0, R21
SUBZE R21
// Check for carry
CMP $0, R21
ISEL $2, R5, R8, R5
ISEL $2, R6, R9, R6
MOVD 40(R4), R8
MOVD 48(R4), R9
ADDC R8, R5
ADDE R9, R6
MOVD R5, 0(R3)
MOVD R6, 8(R3)
RET
+1 -4
View File
@@ -22,10 +22,7 @@ func poly1305vx(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte)
//go:noescape
func poly1305vmsl(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte)
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
if cpu.S390X.HasVX {
var mPtr *byte
if len(m) > 0 {
+23 -12
View File
@@ -17,12 +17,14 @@ import (
// These constants from [PROTOCOL.certkeys] represent the algorithm names
// for certificate types supported by this package.
const (
CertAlgoRSAv01 = "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoDSAv01 = "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoECDSA256v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoECDSA384v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoECDSA521v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoED25519v01 = "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoRSAv01 = "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoDSAv01 = "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoECDSA256v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoECDSA384v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoECDSA521v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01 = "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoED25519v01 = "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoSKED25519v01 = "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
)
// Certificate types distinguish between host and user
@@ -37,6 +39,7 @@ const (
type Signature struct {
Format string
Blob []byte
Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// CertTimeInfinity can be used for OpenSSHCertV01.ValidBefore to indicate that
@@ -429,12 +432,14 @@ func (c *Certificate) SignCert(rand io.Reader, authority Signer) error {
}
var certAlgoNames = map[string]string{
KeyAlgoRSA: CertAlgoRSAv01,
KeyAlgoDSA: CertAlgoDSAv01,
KeyAlgoECDSA256: CertAlgoECDSA256v01,
KeyAlgoECDSA384: CertAlgoECDSA384v01,
KeyAlgoECDSA521: CertAlgoECDSA521v01,
KeyAlgoED25519: CertAlgoED25519v01,
KeyAlgoRSA: CertAlgoRSAv01,
KeyAlgoDSA: CertAlgoDSAv01,
KeyAlgoECDSA256: CertAlgoECDSA256v01,
KeyAlgoECDSA384: CertAlgoECDSA384v01,
KeyAlgoECDSA521: CertAlgoECDSA521v01,
KeyAlgoSKECDSA256: CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01,
KeyAlgoED25519: CertAlgoED25519v01,
KeyAlgoSKED25519: CertAlgoSKED25519v01,
}
// certToPrivAlgo returns the underlying algorithm for a certificate algorithm.
@@ -518,6 +523,12 @@ func parseSignatureBody(in []byte) (out *Signature, rest []byte, ok bool) {
return
}
switch out.Format {
case KeyAlgoSKECDSA256, CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01, KeyAlgoSKED25519, CertAlgoSKED25519v01:
out.Rest = in
return out, nil, ok
}
return out, in, ok
}
+31 -20
View File
@@ -16,9 +16,8 @@ import (
"hash"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"math/bits"
"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20"
"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20"
"golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305"
)
@@ -642,8 +641,8 @@ const chacha20Poly1305ID = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"
// the methods here also implement padding, which RFC4253 Section 6
// also requires of stream ciphers.
type chacha20Poly1305Cipher struct {
lengthKey [8]uint32
contentKey [8]uint32
lengthKey [32]byte
contentKey [32]byte
buf []byte
}
@@ -656,21 +655,21 @@ func newChaCha20Cipher(key, unusedIV, unusedMACKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionA
buf: make([]byte, 256),
}
for i := range c.contentKey {
c.contentKey[i] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[i*4 : (i+1)*4])
}
for i := range c.lengthKey {
c.lengthKey[i] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[(i+8)*4 : (i+9)*4])
}
copy(c.contentKey[:], key[:32])
copy(c.lengthKey[:], key[32:])
return c, nil
}
func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
nonce := [3]uint32{0, 0, bits.ReverseBytes32(seqNum)}
s := chacha20.New(c.contentKey, nonce)
var polyKey [32]byte
nonce := make([]byte, 12)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonce[8:], seqNum)
s, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.contentKey[:], nonce)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var polyKey, discardBuf [32]byte
s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:])
s.Advance() // skip next 32 bytes
s.XORKeyStream(discardBuf[:], discardBuf[:]) // skip the next 32 bytes
encryptedLength := c.buf[:4]
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, encryptedLength); err != nil {
@@ -678,7 +677,11 @@ func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([
}
var lenBytes [4]byte
chacha20.New(c.lengthKey, nonce).XORKeyStream(lenBytes[:], encryptedLength)
ls, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.lengthKey[:], nonce)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ls.XORKeyStream(lenBytes[:], encryptedLength)
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(lenBytes[:])
if length > maxPacket {
@@ -724,11 +727,15 @@ func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([
}
func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, payload []byte) error {
nonce := [3]uint32{0, 0, bits.ReverseBytes32(seqNum)}
s := chacha20.New(c.contentKey, nonce)
var polyKey [32]byte
nonce := make([]byte, 12)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonce[8:], seqNum)
s, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.contentKey[:], nonce)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var polyKey, discardBuf [32]byte
s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:])
s.Advance() // skip next 32 bytes
s.XORKeyStream(discardBuf[:], discardBuf[:]) // skip the next 32 bytes
// There is no blocksize, so fall back to multiple of 8 byte
// padding, as described in RFC 4253, Sec 6.
@@ -748,7 +755,11 @@ func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, r
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.buf, uint32(1+len(payload)+padding))
chacha20.New(c.lengthKey, nonce).XORKeyStream(c.buf, c.buf[:4])
ls, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.lengthKey[:], nonce)
if err != nil {
return err
}
ls.XORKeyStream(c.buf, c.buf[:4])
c.buf[4] = byte(padding)
copy(c.buf[5:], payload)
packetEnd := 5 + len(payload) + padding
+254 -26
View File
@@ -30,12 +30,14 @@ import (
// These constants represent the algorithm names for key types supported by this
// package.
const (
KeyAlgoRSA = "ssh-rsa"
KeyAlgoDSA = "ssh-dss"
KeyAlgoECDSA256 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256"
KeyAlgoECDSA384 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384"
KeyAlgoECDSA521 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521"
KeyAlgoED25519 = "ssh-ed25519"
KeyAlgoRSA = "ssh-rsa"
KeyAlgoDSA = "ssh-dss"
KeyAlgoECDSA256 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256"
KeyAlgoSKECDSA256 = "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
KeyAlgoECDSA384 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384"
KeyAlgoECDSA521 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521"
KeyAlgoED25519 = "ssh-ed25519"
KeyAlgoSKED25519 = "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
)
// These constants represent non-default signature algorithms that are supported
@@ -58,9 +60,13 @@ func parsePubKey(in []byte, algo string) (pubKey PublicKey, rest []byte, err err
return parseDSA(in)
case KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521:
return parseECDSA(in)
case KeyAlgoSKECDSA256:
return parseSKECDSA(in)
case KeyAlgoED25519:
return parseED25519(in)
case CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoED25519v01:
case KeyAlgoSKED25519:
return parseSKEd25519(in)
case CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01, CertAlgoED25519v01, CertAlgoSKED25519v01:
cert, err := parseCert(in, certToPrivAlgo(algo))
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
@@ -685,6 +691,218 @@ func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey {
return (*ecdsa.PublicKey)(k)
}
// skFields holds the additional fields present in U2F/FIDO2 signatures.
// See openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f 'SSH U2F Signatures' for details.
type skFields struct {
// Flags contains U2F/FIDO2 flags such as 'user present'
Flags byte
// Counter is a monotonic signature counter which can be
// used to detect concurrent use of a private key, should
// it be extracted from hardware.
Counter uint32
}
type skECDSAPublicKey struct {
// application is a URL-like string, typically "ssh:" for SSH.
// see openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f for details.
application string
ecdsa.PublicKey
}
func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Type() string {
return KeyAlgoSKECDSA256
}
func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) nistID() string {
return "nistp256"
}
func parseSKECDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) {
var w struct {
Curve string
KeyBytes []byte
Application string
Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
key := new(skECDSAPublicKey)
key.application = w.Application
if w.Curve != "nistp256" {
return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: unsupported curve")
}
key.Curve = elliptic.P256()
key.X, key.Y = elliptic.Unmarshal(key.Curve, w.KeyBytes)
if key.X == nil || key.Y == nil {
return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid curve point")
}
return key, w.Rest, nil
}
func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Marshal() []byte {
// See RFC 5656, section 3.1.
keyBytes := elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y)
w := struct {
Name string
ID string
Key []byte
Application string
}{
k.Type(),
k.nistID(),
keyBytes,
k.application,
}
return Marshal(&w)
}
func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
if sig.Format != k.Type() {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type())
}
h := ecHash(k.Curve).New()
h.Write([]byte(k.application))
appDigest := h.Sum(nil)
h.Reset()
h.Write(data)
dataDigest := h.Sum(nil)
var ecSig struct {
R *big.Int
S *big.Int
}
if err := Unmarshal(sig.Blob, &ecSig); err != nil {
return err
}
var skf skFields
if err := Unmarshal(sig.Rest, &skf); err != nil {
return err
}
blob := struct {
ApplicationDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
Flags byte
Counter uint32
MessageDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}{
appDigest,
skf.Flags,
skf.Counter,
dataDigest,
}
original := Marshal(blob)
h.Reset()
h.Write(original)
digest := h.Sum(nil)
if ecdsa.Verify((*ecdsa.PublicKey)(&k.PublicKey), digest, ecSig.R, ecSig.S) {
return nil
}
return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify")
}
type skEd25519PublicKey struct {
// application is a URL-like string, typically "ssh:" for SSH.
// see openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f for details.
application string
ed25519.PublicKey
}
func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Type() string {
return KeyAlgoSKED25519
}
func parseSKEd25519(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) {
var w struct {
KeyBytes []byte
Application string
Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
key := new(skEd25519PublicKey)
key.application = w.Application
key.PublicKey = ed25519.PublicKey(w.KeyBytes)
return key, w.Rest, nil
}
func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Marshal() []byte {
w := struct {
Name string
KeyBytes []byte
Application string
}{
KeyAlgoSKED25519,
[]byte(k.PublicKey),
k.application,
}
return Marshal(&w)
}
func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
if sig.Format != k.Type() {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type())
}
h := sha256.New()
h.Write([]byte(k.application))
appDigest := h.Sum(nil)
h.Reset()
h.Write(data)
dataDigest := h.Sum(nil)
var edSig struct {
Signature []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
if err := Unmarshal(sig.Blob, &edSig); err != nil {
return err
}
var skf skFields
if err := Unmarshal(sig.Rest, &skf); err != nil {
return err
}
blob := struct {
ApplicationDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
Flags byte
Counter uint32
MessageDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}{
appDigest,
skf.Flags,
skf.Counter,
dataDigest,
}
original := Marshal(blob)
edKey := (ed25519.PublicKey)(k.PublicKey)
if ok := ed25519.Verify(edKey, original, edSig.Signature); !ok {
return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify")
}
return nil
}
// NewSignerFromKey takes an *rsa.PrivateKey, *dsa.PrivateKey,
// *ecdsa.PrivateKey or any other crypto.Signer and returns a
// corresponding Signer instance. ECDSA keys must use P-256, P-384 or
@@ -837,7 +1055,8 @@ func NewPublicKey(key interface{}) (PublicKey, error) {
}
// ParsePrivateKey returns a Signer from a PEM encoded private key. It supports
// the same keys as ParseRawPrivateKey.
// the same keys as ParseRawPrivateKey. If the private key is encrypted, it
// will return a PassphraseMissingError.
func ParsePrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (Signer, error) {
key, err := ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes)
if err != nil {
@@ -850,8 +1069,8 @@ func ParsePrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (Signer, error) {
// ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase returns a Signer from a PEM encoded private
// key and passphrase. It supports the same keys as
// ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase.
func ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passPhrase []byte) (Signer, error) {
key, err := ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passPhrase)
func ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passphrase []byte) (Signer, error) {
key, err := ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passphrase)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -867,8 +1086,21 @@ func encryptedBlock(block *pem.Block) bool {
return strings.Contains(block.Headers["Proc-Type"], "ENCRYPTED")
}
// A PassphraseMissingError indicates that parsing this private key requires a
// passphrase. Use ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase.
type PassphraseMissingError struct {
// PublicKey will be set if the private key format includes an unencrypted
// public key along with the encrypted private key.
PublicKey PublicKey
}
func (*PassphraseMissingError) Error() string {
return "ssh: this private key is passphrase protected"
}
// ParseRawPrivateKey returns a private key from a PEM encoded private key. It
// supports RSA (PKCS#1), PKCS#8, DSA (OpenSSL), and ECDSA private keys.
// supports RSA (PKCS#1), PKCS#8, DSA (OpenSSL), and ECDSA private keys. If the
// private key is encrypted, it will return a PassphraseMissingError.
func ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (interface{}, error) {
block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
if block == nil {
@@ -876,7 +1108,7 @@ func ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (interface{}, error) {
}
if encryptedBlock(block) {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: cannot decode encrypted private keys")
return nil, &PassphraseMissingError{}
}
switch block.Type {
@@ -899,24 +1131,22 @@ func ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (interface{}, error) {
// ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase returns a private key decrypted with
// passphrase from a PEM encoded private key. If wrong passphrase, return
// x509.IncorrectPasswordError.
func ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passPhrase []byte) (interface{}, error) {
func ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passphrase []byte) (interface{}, error) {
block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
if block == nil {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: no key found")
}
buf := block.Bytes
if encryptedBlock(block) {
if x509.IsEncryptedPEMBlock(block) {
var err error
buf, err = x509.DecryptPEMBlock(block, passPhrase)
if err != nil {
if err == x509.IncorrectPasswordError {
return nil, err
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cannot decode encrypted private keys: %v", err)
}
if !encryptedBlock(block) || !x509.IsEncryptedPEMBlock(block) {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: not an encrypted key")
}
buf, err := x509.DecryptPEMBlock(block, passphrase)
if err != nil {
if err == x509.IncorrectPasswordError {
return nil, err
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cannot decode encrypted private keys: %v", err)
}
switch block.Type {
@@ -926,8 +1156,6 @@ func ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passPhrase []byte) (interface{},
return x509.ParseECPrivateKey(buf)
case "DSA PRIVATE KEY":
return ParseDSAPrivateKey(buf)
case "OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY":
return parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(buf)
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %q", block.Type)
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -284,8 +284,8 @@ func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error)
func isAcceptableAlgo(algo string) bool {
switch algo {
case KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoDSA, KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521, KeyAlgoED25519,
CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoED25519v01:
case KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoDSA, KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521, KeyAlgoSKECDSA256, KeyAlgoED25519, KeyAlgoSKED25519,
CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01, CertAlgoED25519v01, CertAlgoSKED25519v01:
return true
}
return false