# Author:: Donald Stufft () # Copyright:: Copyright (c) 2013 Donald Stufft # License:: Apache License, Version 2.0 # # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. # You may obtain a copy of the License at # # http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 # # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software # distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and # limitations under the License. from __future__ import absolute_import from __future__ import division import hmac import os import warnings from .__about__ import ( __author__, __copyright__, __email__, __license__, __summary__, __title__, __uri__, __version__, ) from . import _bcrypt # noqa: I100 __all__ = [ "__title__", "__summary__", "__uri__", "__version__", "__author__", "__email__", "__license__", "__copyright__", "gensalt", "hashpw", "kdf", "checkpw", ] def gensalt(rounds: int = 12, prefix: bytes = b"2b") -> bytes: if prefix not in (b"2a", b"2b"): raise ValueError("Supported prefixes are b'2a' or b'2b'") if rounds < 4 or rounds > 31: raise ValueError("Invalid rounds") salt = os.urandom(16) output = _bcrypt.encode_base64(salt) return ( b"$" + prefix + b"$" + ("%2.2u" % rounds).encode("ascii") + b"$" + output ) def hashpw(password: bytes, salt: bytes) -> bytes: if isinstance(password, str) or isinstance(salt, str): raise TypeError("Strings must be encoded before hashing") # bcrypt originally suffered from a wraparound bug: # http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/01/02/4 # This bug was corrected in the OpenBSD source by truncating inputs to 72 # bytes on the updated prefix $2b$, but leaving $2a$ unchanged for # compatibility. However, pyca/bcrypt 2.0.0 *did* correctly truncate inputs # on $2a$, so we do it here to preserve compatibility with 2.0.0 password = password[:72] return _bcrypt.hashpass(password, salt) def checkpw(password: bytes, hashed_password: bytes) -> bool: if isinstance(password, str) or isinstance(hashed_password, str): raise TypeError("Strings must be encoded before checking") ret = hashpw(password, hashed_password) return hmac.compare_digest(ret, hashed_password) def kdf( password: bytes, salt: bytes, desired_key_bytes: int, rounds: int, ignore_few_rounds: bool = False, ) -> bytes: if isinstance(password, str) or isinstance(salt, str): raise TypeError("Strings must be encoded before hashing") if len(password) == 0 or len(salt) == 0: raise ValueError("password and salt must not be empty") if desired_key_bytes <= 0 or desired_key_bytes > 512: raise ValueError("desired_key_bytes must be 1-512") if rounds < 1: raise ValueError("rounds must be 1 or more") if rounds < 50 and not ignore_few_rounds: # They probably think bcrypt.kdf()'s rounds parameter is logarithmic, # expecting this value to be slow enough (it probably would be if this # were bcrypt). Emit a warning. warnings.warn( ( "Warning: bcrypt.kdf() called with only {0} round(s). " "This few is not secure: the parameter is linear, like PBKDF2." ).format(rounds), UserWarning, stacklevel=2, ) return _bcrypt.pbkdf(password, salt, rounds, desired_key_bytes)